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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Foundational Weakness in the Federal Fair Housing Act
In the midst of 1968's titanic congressional contest over new civil rights
legislation, powerful southern Democratic senators, such as Senator Ervin of North
Carolina, fought in futility to balance their party's politics, their constituents'
wishes, and their constitutional conservatism. In no area of civil rights reform was
this dilemma more intense than in housing rights reform. The housing reform law,
2
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generally known as the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA), was enacted as Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.2 The FHA, as enacted, provided for a broad
prohibition against discriminatory activity in the sale or rental of housing units,
where discrimination is based on race, color, national origin, or religion.3 In 1974,
Congress expanded the list of prohibited discrimination categories to include "sex"4
and in 1988 further expanded the list to include "handicap" and "familial status."5
That the senators' dilemma was never resolved is manifested in the continuing
criticisms of the FHA as both repressive6 and ineffective.7
In this Article the author describes some fundamental and foundational
weaknesses in the FH-A, weaknesses that leave it vulnerable to continuing criticism,
widespread disrespect and violation, and even eventual extinguishment. However,
it is not the author's ultimate purpose to discredit the FHA or turn back the societal
clock to racial conditions of the 1960s. The author refrained from writing this
Article until he felt he could propose a different and better way to achieve an
authentic, open-housing regime within the framework of the American legal system.
The most important purpose of this Article is to describe and advocate this different
legal framework for open housing, a proposal that upholds rights of property and
rests on legislative and judicial integrity. If this proposal seems presently
superfluous, it should be kept in mind that the FHA's constitutional validity has not
been carefully scrutinized in the courts and not at all by the Supreme Court. As
ideologies shift among the Justices and lack of previous precedent or review
weakens the potential force of stare decisis, a different and more legitimate method
of achieving open housing may be desirable. Thus, it is hoped that this Article will
be viewed as a positive effort to strengthen and preserve gains toward the goal of
an open society, and not as an attack on past achievements.
Nevertheless, in this Article the author must first portray the need for a different
legal approach to open housing by showing the FHA's vulnerabilities. This Article
raises the possibility that in trying to do too much the FHA does nothing very well.
Is the FHA the wrong tool wielded by the wrong hands for the wrong reasons? Are
important provisions of the FHA arguably unconstitutional both in inception and
in application? Do many Americans of good will continue to ignore or resist FHA's
commands in areas where it least comports with common sense and compelling
2. Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631
(1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
3. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. VIII § 804(a), 82 Stat. 83 (1968).
4. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-383, tit. VIII § 808(b)(1), 88 Stat. 729 (1974).
5. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 100-430, tit. VIII § 6(a)-(b), 102 Stat. 1620-22 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Mary Caroline Lee, Note, The Conflict Between "Fair Housing" and Free Speech,
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1223 (1996) (concluding that there remains a potentially chilling effect
on the housing opponents' First Amendment rights and proposing recommendations to safeguard
those rights).
7. See, e.g., John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1067, 1071 (1998) ("Among the modem civil rights laws, fair housing law persists
as the least effective.").
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social need?8 Should the FHA be the lever to open society generally, attacking not
only racism but almost every other private prejudice?
One who reads the text of the FHA for the first time may be struck by what an
odd and awkward example of legislation it is. The statement of policy9 and
recitation of definitions'0 which introduce the legislation are followed by a list of
effective dates and exemptions." Because of this arrangement, one is confronted
with a complex set of exemptions before the substantive commands 2 of the FHA
are described. Nowhere in the FHA are its restraints and prohibitions addressed to
specific parties; prohibitions of conduct are presumably applicable to any person or
entity capable of committing such conduct. In fact, this is suggested by the
definition of "Respondent" as "the person or other entity accused in a complaint of
an unfair housing practice."'
3
The substance of the FHA may be succinctly described. It purports to prohibit
any type of activity in connection with the sale or rental of real property that is
tainted by an intent to discriminate on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin." 14 A particularly broad restraint is in § 3604(c)
prohibiting any statement, notice, or advertisement expressing an intent to
discriminate, 5 and from which restraint no party is exempt.'6 Exemptions from
other provisions are generally extended to owners of fewer than four housing
units.
17
B. Organization of Article
In Part II of this Article the author examines the constitutional foundations of
the original FHA by reviewing and comparing the issues raised in the congressional
debates and in post-enactment litigation regarding whether Congress had
constitutional authority to enact the private conduct provisions of this legislation.
The constitutionality concerns addressed in this Article deal with the purely private
conduct provisions of the original FHA. The proclaimed policy of the FHA is to
provide for fair housing "within constitutional limitations";" however, even while
suggesting the existence of constitutional limitations, the FHA does not attempt to
identify or define them. In Part II the author investigates whether those limitations
on congressional authority in this area have come into clearer view since 1968.
8. See Robert G. Schwemm, The Limits ofLitigation Under the FairHousingAct of1968, in THE
FAIRHoUSING ACTAFTERTwENTYYEARS 43 (Robert G. Schwemm ed., 1989); James A. Kushner, The
Role of the Federal Government, id. at 48.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
10. Id. § 3602.
11. Id. § 3603.
12. Id. § 3604.
13. Id. § 3602(n)(1).
14. Id. § 3604(a).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994).
16. Id. § 3603(b).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 3601.
[Vol. 53: 7
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In Part II the author concludes that FHA opponents' complaints of
unconstitutionality regarding federal authority to regulate this type of private
conduct were probably well-founded, even though implicitly rejected by passage
of the legislation. The provisions of the FHA, as well as the FHA debates in the
Senate-which conducted the only significant discussion on this legislation-did
not address the issues concerning constitutional limitations. In addition, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never directly decided these issues, and the lower federal court
decisions on these issues have been inconsistent, contradictory, and incomplete.
In Part HI, the focus shifts from possible constitutional limitations on the
authority to enact private conduct provisions of the FHA, to an examination of
whether the application of such FHA provisions may actually or arguably cross
constitutional limitations. Again in Part Im the author concludes that several types
of extensive, private conduct regulation attempted by the FHA likely violate
constitutional restraints, especially First Amendment restraints.
In Part IV the author summarizes the conclusions drawn from Parts II and HI,
indicates the particular parts of the FHA that may be most vulnerable to challenge,
and suggests a minimal corrective amendment. Part V sets forth proposals for a
legal regime that will enable this nation to achieve open and nondiscriminatory
housing by means of established legal principles consistent with the U.S.
Constitution and with common law property rights. In Part VI the author
summarizes and evaluates the conclusions reached.
II. WAS THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT CONSTITUTIONAL?
Addressing the question above may seem like an exercise in futility, because
judicial challenges to FHA constitutionality so far have all been unsuccessful. Still,
review and reappraisal of debates over the Act's constitutionality are remarkably
instructive.' 9 This part of the Article will show that the senators who were the most
outspoken opponents of the FHA raised only sporadic and tepid protests over the
FHA's constitutionality, therefore mounting no concerted challenge. This is
manifest: (1) in the absence of any language in the Act itself that purports to lay a
constitutional foundation for the Act, and (2) in the Senate debate references to
constitutionality that are scattered, nonspecific, and infrequent. Thus, Congress
gave no definitive attention to the matter of "constitutional limitations" that appears
in the FHA's proclamation of public policy.2" Of the few federal courts that have
dealt with this issue, most have completely ignored the constitutional justifications
raised in the congressional debates and other items of legislative history and have
19. As the civil rights movement was gaining momentum, only small voices were heard in
defense of traditional constitutional interpretations thatwould be submerged in civil rights legislation.
See, e.g., OPEN OCCUPANCY VS. FORCED HOUSING UNDERTHEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT (Alfred Avins
ed., 1963) (collecting articles that discuss the interrelationship of the Constitution and existing anti-
discrimination laws).
20. "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair
housing throughout the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994) (emphasis added).
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fashioned their own constitutional analyses along completely different lines.2
Significantly, the courts' decisions proclaimed constitutional authority only for the
particular provisions at issue in the cases before them, even if their conclusions
extended no constitutional authority to other provisions of the FHA.' This is most
evident in the decisions that find the FHA's constitutional authority exclusively in
the Thirteenth Amendment, which-at best-can sustain FHA prohibitions only
against discriminatory practices directed at African Americans.23
A. Constitutional Authority Cited in the Language of the Act
It is common to find in federal legislation some language suggesting or stating
the constitutional provisions from which drafters purport to draw their authority to
legislate.24 This is premised on the elementary learning that the federal legislative
power is limited to those powers assigned to the federal government under the U.S.
Constitution, with all other powers reserved to the states and the people.25
By contrast, one finds in the language of the FHA only one, small, question-
begging nod to a constitutional restraint: "It is the policy of the United States to
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States. 26 No other provision of the FHA addresses what the constitutional
limitations might be or in what way the providing of "fair housing throughout the
United States" falls within federal legislative power. Perhaps this absence of
constitutional rationale in the statutory language should not be surprising
considering how little attention was accorded constitutionality during the debates
on the FHA.27
B. References to Constitutional Authority in the FHA Legislative History
1. Congressional Reports
The only official item of legislative history for the FHA is a Senate Report that
addressed solely the other civil rights provisions in the legislation containing the
FHA. The discussion of constitutional issues in that report was directed almost
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. See infra Part II.C.
23. See infra Part II.C.
24. For instance, in Title I of the legislation containing the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII) a
prohibition against rioting is directed against one who "travels in interstate or foreign commerce or
uses any facility of interstate or foreign commerce, including, but not limited to, the mail, telegraph,
telephone, radio, or television .. " 18 U.S.C. § 2101 (1994).
25. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 404 (1819); U.S. CONST. amend. X.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994) (emphasis added). The phrase "within constitutional limitations"
was not in the original wording of this legislation when it was introduced in the Senate on February
6, 1968. See 114 CONG. REc. 2270 (1968).
27. See infra Part II.B.2.
[Vol. 53:7
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entirely to the provisions imposing federal criminal penalties on persons convicted
of interstate riot activities.28
2. Congressional Debates
As a matter of legislative history, the Congressional Record report of floor
debates on the FHA indicates that opponents of the FHA were concerned about the
constitutionality of provisions governing private conduct, but apparently found little
audience for their voices of protest. However, proponents did not ignore the
protests, but actually presented a prepared response. Following is a summary of the
discussions of FHA constitutionality raised on the Senate floor.
In the Senate on January 24, 1968, the bill being debated carried only an
incidental open-housing provision, subjecting then existing state fair housing laws
to federal criminal enforcement.29 Sounding a main theme of opposition to this
provision and perhaps to open-housing laws generally, Senator Sparkman criticized
the proposal as "legislation that allows the Federal Government to usurp powers
and rights and privileges of the State courts and local courts and take them away
from the people in the communities and States" and as "bad law."30 He criticized
a 1962 executive order requiring open housing in government-financed (Veterans
Administration and Federal Housing Administration) housing projects as
unconstitutional, first, because it usurped the authority of Congress,3' and second,
because it interfered with private property rights:
[A]ttempts to dictate the conditions under which a person can sell
or rent his own property, both in the conventional market and in
federally assisted programs, leads only to inefficiency,
misunderstanding, interminable administrative problems, and
accomplishes very little other than a deprivation of important
property rights in the conventional field to which every landowner
is entitled.32
On February 5, 1968, Senator Kennedy argued that the federal government
should act on fair housing, because Federal Housing Administration financing
policies for twenty years after World War II helped create patterns of segregation,
and that federal power is needed to undo this harm.33 Moreover, he argued that state
and local governments are unwilling to alter this pattern.34 He also discussed other
reasons for federal government action:
28. S. REP. No. 90-721 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1837 (commenting only on the
parts of the bill concerning interference with civil rights activities).
29. 114 CONG. REC. 918-19 (1968).
30. Id. at 919.
31. Id. at 912-20.
32. Id. at 920.
33. Id. at 2085.
34. Id.
2001]
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[I]solation in housing creates clear-cut and debilitating effects on
commerce.
With mobility in living growing each year, a national pattern
of racial isolation impedes and distorts commerce in vital areas.
Moreover, the spreading tensions which racial isolation
spawns can foster a welter of problems-ranging from civil
disorder to public housing policy to education-which will require
Federal assistance.
And perhaps fundamentally, we require a Federal open-
housing law because the promise of racial equality has
consistently stemmed from the Federal Government.
A Federal open-housing law is only the start of a vigorous
Federal housing policy-but it is a necessary step, and it should be
taken this session.35
On February 6, 1968, Senator Mondale introduced an amendment to the Civil
Rights Act that included the current fair housing act provisions.36 He then inserted
into the record a summary of the amendment's provisions, questions and answers
describing the provisions, and a summary of the constitutional arguments which,
in his opinion, established beyond doubt the constitutionality of the Fair Housing
Act.3 7 For example, question nine of the Questions and Answers stated:
9. Does the Congress have the constitutional power to prohibit
discrimination in housing?
Yes. Supreme Court decisions clearly state that Congress has
this power both under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Commerce Clause. A summary of these decisions has been
prepared and is available.3"
Following the Questions and Answers, this summary appears in the
CongressionalRecord as a document entitled "Fair Housing Act of 1967, Summary
of Constitutional Bases."39 The content of this document is described, compared,
and analyzed below.40 Senator Mondale then addressed the issues covered in
August 1967 committee hearings addressing open-housing legislation.4 He reported
that "the hearings destroyed the constitutional issue. In the period from the time fair
35. 114 CONG. REc. 2085-86 (1968).
36. Id. at 2270-72.
37. Id. at 2272-74.
38. Id. at 2273.
39. Id.
40. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
41. 114 CONG. REc. 2274-75 (1968).
[Vol. 53: 7
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housing was first introduced and the time when we will consider it in voting, the
U.S. Supreme Court has issued many rulings that clearly develop, without any
doubt, the validity of this proposal on constitutional grounds." 42
OnFebruary 7, 1968, Senator Tydings argued for the constitutionality of open-
housing laws generally, and for the Mondale amendment specifically,43 and inserted
into the Congressional Record a brief on this issue prepared by the Department of
Justice." The brief s arguments for open-housing constitutionality are presented and
analyzed below. 45 Senator Tydings then delivered his most extensive plea for the
necessity of an open-housing law:
Mr. [Senate] President, the presence of residential ghettos-in
effect, restricted areas in which all members of a minority group
are forced to reside no matter where they desire or can afford to
live-brings gravely damaging social consequences to our country,
particularly in our urban areas.
I strongly believe that a man's religion, national origin, or
race has no bearing on his worth as a human being or his
desirability as a neighbor. Yet, as I have said, purposeful
exclusion from residential neighborhoods particularly on grounds
of race, is the rule rather than the exception in many parts of our
country. Such exclusion unjustly denies many Americans the
freedom to gain access on equal terms with other Americans to
good housing and good schools for their children, and proximity
to good jobs. Such exclusion unjustly denies many Americans of
an equal opportunity to better their lives.
Some people assert that, as a matter of principle, some
Americans should be free to treat other Americans unjustly. I do
not believe this. I am not in favor of giving any person or group
preferential treatment in seeking housing. I believe that landlords
and property owners should be free to demand proper
qualifications of prospective tenants or home buyers, such as
adequate income, good credit record, proper family size to insure
against overcrowding, and so forth. But I firmly believe that
sellers and landlords must deal with everyone fairly and equally,
by not excluding anyone from residences solely because of race,
religion, or national creed.
I believe that this principle of equal treatment is fundamental
to the American way of life."
42. Id. at 2275.
43. Id. at 2530-34.
44. Id. at 2534-37.
45. See infra Part II.B.3.b.
46. 114 CONG. REc. 2537 (1968).
2001]
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At this time Senator Ervin entered into an exchange with Senator Tydings,
arguing that under the proposed amendment that: "[I]f [a seller] has two
prospective buyers, of two different races, one of them belonging to his race and
one to the other race, he is forbidden to prefer the man of his own race."'47 Senator
Tydings agreed with the result, proclaiming "[t]he effect of the law is to make
certain that the sale is not based on racial discrimination.
'
,
48
On February 8, 1968, Senator Thurmond delivered a lengthy rebuttal to the
claims of constitutionality for the FHA.49 He rejected any notion that the Fourteenth
Amendment provisions could regulate purely private conduct." As for
congressional power based on the Commerce Clause, he declared:
Admittedly, the [C]ommerce [C]lause has been cited as
authority for far-reaching legislative enactments in recent years.
If it does indeed authorize Congress to regulate private action
dealing with the sale or rental of real property situated wholly
within the borders of one State, then there is no field of endeavor
which Congress cannot control under the authority granted in this
clause. There is no question in my mind but that such an elastic
view exceeds the power intended to be granted Congress by the
[F]ramers of the Constitution. Had they intended otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution certainly would not have gone to the
time and trouble of delineating certain specific grants ofpower to
Congress....
Under no theory of either the [C]ommerce [C]lause or the
Fourteenth Amendment do I find constitutional authority to
deprive any individual of his basic, inherent right to hold, use, and
enjoy private property.5
On February 27, 1968, Senator Eastland spoke against the open-housing
amendment, 2 pointing to proponents' declarations that open housing was merely
the first step in an effort to rearrange all United States housing, mostly to eliminate
urban ghettos.53 He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment does not empower
Congress to enact legislation that restricts purely private conduct such as sale or
rental of housing. 4
The next day, on February 28, 1968, Senator Dirksen, who had previously
opposed the fair housing provisions, suddenly offered a substitute version of the
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2717-18.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2718.
52. 114 CONG. REC. 4295-98 (1968).
53. Id. at 4296.
54. Id.
[Vol. 53: 7
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civil rights bill, which included the fair housing provisions, and then moved to close
debate before amendments to the substitute could be offered.5 Senator Ervin
criticized the proposed substitute for prohibiting any person, black or white, from
selling or renting their property to persons of their own race or religion against a
demand from one of another race or religion to sell or rent.56 He declared: "The
right of private property, which includes the right to sell one's privately owned
property or to lease one's privately owned property to whomever he pleases, is, in
my judgment, one of the most sacred rights of an American citizen.
57
On February 29, 1968, Senator Ervin delivered an extensive argument against
the constitutionality of the open-housing provisions, the points of which argument
are summarized as follows:
A. Under the Constitution the federal government has power to regulate interstate
commerce and states have "power to regulate the ownership and use of
privately owned property within their borders. In the absence of State
regulation to the contrary, every owner of privately owned property has the
right to sell or rent such property to any person selected by himself." 8
B. Constitutional principles retain their original meaning until changed by
amendment; to prevent change by usurpation or nullification, federal officials
are bound by oath to support the Constitution. 9
C. Both explicitly and implicitly the Constitutionprotects individual rights against
"tyranny at the hands of the Federal government": 0
1. Americans have the right to have their "rights and responsibilities under
Federal law defined by certain and uniform laws applying to all [persons]
in like circumstances";
2. Americans have the right to have their "personal dealings with other
individuals regulated by [their] own desires or by the laws of the
State... rather than by the laws or regulations of a centralized Federal
Government"; 62
3. "Every American has the right to acquire, own, use, and dispose of
property in all ways permitted by State laws without interference from the
Federal Government" ;63
55. Id. at 4570-76. Amendments could not be offered at the time because a printed version of
the substitute bill would not be available until the next morning, by which time, under the Dirksen
cloture motion, opportunity for debate would be past. Id. at 4576.
56. Id. at 4576.
57. Id.
58. 114 CONG. REc. 4684 (1968).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 4684.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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4. "Every American has the right to rent or sell his property, in person or
through agents, to any persons selected by him, if State laws so permit,
without interference from the Federal Government";4
5. "Every American has the right to think and speak his honest thoughts
concerning all things under the sun";65
6. "No American shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law."66
D. Persons who favor this law are "men of good intentions, who are willing to do
constitutional evil because they believe good will result from it."67 They would
deprive all Americans of rights in order to confer an illusory notion of equality
on certain classes of citizens. There is no need of further legislation to confer
equal rights. Economic or social equality cannot be conferred by law. The
proposed legislation does not confer equality, but instead confers on its
beneficiaries greater rights than have ever before been recognized in our
country.
6 8
He concluded this part of his argument on this point:
I repudiate these arguments [of the open housing proponents]
as unwise. Americans must choose between equality coerced by
law and the freedom of the individual. She cannot have both. As
for me, I choose freedom of the individual as the more precious
of the incompatible things.
This proposal undertakes to confer upon the Federal
Government the ultimate power to regulate and control private
dealings between private individuals in respect to privately owned
property of a residential nature. There is not a syllable in the
Constitution that gives the Federal Government the power to
govern transactions between individuals in respect to privately
owned property or to regulate the title to real estate. This proposal
strikes at a very basic liberty of all Americans, because, as John
Adams said: "Property must be made secure or liberty cannot
exist.
69
E. The prohibitions against statements or advertising violate the First Amendment
requiring Congress to make no law abridging the freedom of speech.70
64. 114 CONG. REC. 4684 (1968).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 4684-85.
69. Id. at 4685.
70. 114 CONG. REC. 4685 (1968).
[Vol. 53: 7
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F. Congress is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment from depriving any person of
property without due process of law.7'
On March 11, 1968, Senator Stennis spoke against the open-housing
provisions, expressing apprehension over the expansion of federal power at the
expense of individual rights, and especially the power that would be assumed and
enlarged by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 2 Senator
Thurmond also spoke against the bill's invasion of private property rights as
without constitutional foundation. 3
Shortly thereafter, the bill was adopted by a vote of 71-20.' 4
As will become more clear in the next section, the battle over constitutionality
was fought principally over the Fourteenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause.
While these positions were outlined and promoted during the floor debates, the
legal details were left to previously generated reports that were simply entered into
the record. It is uncertain how much influence these reports had on the views of the
Senators, especially since views seemed more conspicuously affected by the serious
urban civil disturbances erupting at that time.
7s
3. Open-HousingProponents' Written Responses to the Constitutionality
Issue
a. "Fair Housing Act of 1967: Summary of Constitutional Bases"
In this anonymously-authored document,76 the following points were argued to
support the constitutionality of a federal open-housing law:
A. Congress has the power to enforce the equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the power to enact:
[A] law to remove obstacles in the way of persons' securing the
equal benefits of government-benefits which a State could not
discriminatorily deny them without violating the Clause itself.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641. A law prohibiting
discrimination in housing on account of race, color, religion or
national origin is such a law because discrimination in housing
71. Id. at 4686.
72. Id. at 5986-87.
73. Id. at 5988-89.
74. Id. at 5992.
75. See, e.g., 114 Cong. Rec. 2085-86 (1968) (presenting Senator Kennedy's concerns with
"spreading tensions" associated with racial isolation).
76. Entered into the CongressionalRecordby Senator Mondale on February 6, 1968.114 CONG.
REc. 2272-74 (1968).
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forces its victims to live in segregated areas, or "ghettoes," and
the benefits of government are less available in ghettoes."'
B. The congressional power to enact laws enforcing the equal protection
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to prohibiting acts of private
discrimination.7" The power to enact enforcing laws is based on Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself.79 This power to enact legislation is further
enhanced by the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution, which
"grants Congress the power '[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all . . . Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States."' The Necessary and
Proper Clause is broad enough to include laws effecting private conduct.8 '
C. Discrimination in housing affects interstate commerce in the following ways:
1. Confinement of minority groups to ghettoes restricts the number of new
homes built and reduces the amount of building materials and financing
which move across state lines.8
2. Housing discrimination reduces the likelihood that minorities will move
across state lines to find better employment.
3
Congress may protect interstate commerce from such adverse effects, even if
its principal motive arises out of some other moral reason. 4 "And it does not matter
that the effects against which Congress legislates may be minor or that, taken
individually, they are insignificant. The constitutional basis is present so long as the
effects on commerce, taken as a whole, are present in measurable amounts.""
77. Id. at 2273.
78. Id.
79. Id. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of
this article [the Fourteenth Amendment]." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
80. 114 CONG. REC. 2273 (1968) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
81. Id. (citing, without discussion, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-51 (1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,762,782-
84 (1966)).
82. Id. at 2274.
83. Id.
84. Id. (citing, without discussion, Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Labor Bd. v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,36-37 (1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964)).
85. Id. 114 Cong. Rec. 2274 (1968) (citing "Wickardv. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933 applied to a farmer who sowed only 23 acres of wheat and sold none of it in
interstate commerce, because it nevertheless affected how much other wheat would be shipped in
interstate commerce.) Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (Fair Labor Standards Act
applied to a newspaper whose circulation of 9000 copies included only 45 copies mailed to another
state.)").
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b. Department ofJustice Memorandum
This memorandum,86 much more thoroughly argued and documented than the
summary just discussed, makes the following points supporting the constitutionality
of a federal open-housing law:
A. Federal or state open-housing laws are not unconstitutional for impairing the
obligations of contract, depriving persons of liberty or property without due
process of law, taking property without just compensation, or otherwise
infringing private rights. 7 Private persons may not invoke judicial power in
enforcing a racially restrictive covenant in a deed."8 State courts have upheld
state open-housing laws.s9 Discrimination by restaurants, hotels, theaters, and
other similar businesses has been forbidden.9"
B. Congressional power to enact an open-housing law rests in the Fourteenth
Amendment and in the Commerce Clause.9'
1. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact laws to enforce the
provisions of the amendment.92 In the Reconstruction period Congress
imposed criminal penalties on persons who violated others' constitutional
rights.93 Congress may enact legislation intended to remove obstacles in the
way of persons securing the equal benefits of government, 94 and to correct
the evil effects of past unconstitutionally discriminatory government action
(referring to activities and policies of state and federal governments
leading to segregated housing). 9s Thus, if the negative effects of state-
sponsored rights denials of the past are extant in the present, then Congress
may act to correct those effects.96 Prominent examples of such denials are
racially restrictive zoning regulations and judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive private real covenants. 97 Also, the Federal Housing
Administration routinely required racially restrictive covenants in the
transactions it supported, resulting in extensive deliberate segregation in
federal and state public housing until the middle decades of the twentieth
century.98 Much of this deliberately segregative activity occurred during
the period when great numbers of African Americans migrated from the
86. Entered into the CongressionalRecordby Senator Tydings on February 7, 1968. 114 CONG.
RPc. 2534-37 (1968).
87. Id. at 2534.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 114 CONG. REc. 2534 (1968).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 2534-35.
95. Id. at 2535.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 114 CONG. REc. 2535 (1968).
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South.99 Deliberate segregation in other areas of life, such as schooling and
military service, contributed to segregated housing patterns. 00 In 1967 the
U.S. Supreme Court upheld a California Supreme Court decision
invalidating a state law affirming the right of private landowners to
discriminate in the sale or rental of housing; the provision was viewed as
a form of state encouragement of discrimination.'
In enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the courts are limited to regulating so-called "state action."'
0 2
However, when Congress enforces the Equal Protection Clause, it is
empowered by the Necessary and Proper Clause."' This has been
interpreted as enabling Congress to use all means that are appropriate and
consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, and not prohibited,
to enforce objectives within the scope of the Constitution."' The purpose
of the open-housing law is to remove discrimination that encloses
minorities in ghettoes, where they have less than equal access to benefits
of government and other rewards of life.0 5 Courts have held that
prohibiting private acts of discrimination does not unconstitutionally
impair rights ofcontract, deprive persons of liberty or property without due
process of law, take property without just compensation, or otherwise
infringe constitutional rights.
1 6
A narrower view of congressional enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment is given in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, and
although these cases have never been expressly overruled, they have been
criticized, especially by Justice Brennan in dissenting opinions.0 7 A
majority of Justices in separate and unrelated opinions have stated their
view that Congress may pass legislation to prevent interference with
Fourteenth Amendment rights, even if no state action is involved.'
2. Housing is a significant element of interstate commerce, considering
the amounts of building materials crossing state lines, the interstate
financing transactions, and the fact that every year one family in thirty
moves to a different state. 109 Discrimination in housing adversely affects
interstate commerce in reducing the number of new homes that are built
and the amount of interstate movement of materials and financing."0
99. Id. Between 1910 and 1960, the percentage of African Americans living outside the South
increased from ten percent to forty percent. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
102. 114 CONG. REc. 2535 (1968).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2535-36 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
105. Id. at 2536.
106. Id. (citing no authority for this proposition).
107. Id.
108. 114 CONG. Rc. 2536 (1968).
109. Id.
110. Id.
[Vol. 53: 7
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss1/4
FAIR HOUSING ACT
Interstate movement of minority families and efficient allocation of their
labor is discouraged.'
The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power to
protect interstate commerce from adverse effects such as these.
The power is not restricted to goods or persons in transit. It
extends to all activities which affect interstate commerce, even if
the goods or persons engaged in the activities are not then, or may
never be, traveling in commerce. The power exists even when the
effects upon which it is based are minor, or when taken
individually, they would be insignificant. It is sufficient if the
effects, taken as a whole, are present in measurable amounts. And
it does not matter that when Congress exercises its power under
the Commerce Clause, its motives are not solely to protect
commerce. It can as validly act for moral reasons." 2
4. Summary ofSenators' Opposing Positions on the Constitutionality of
the FHA
By way of summary for this section, the charts below show brief descriptions
of the senators' arguments and counter-arguments on various aspects of open-
housing law constitutionality.
Issue A:
Does an open-housing law deprive owners of an important property right?
Opponents of Open-Housing Law: Proponents of Open-Housing Law:
A private landowner's right to rent or Private discrimination in sale or rental
sell the property is an important right of housing has the effect of denying
which may not be taken by the equal access to good homes, good
government without due process of schools, and goodjobs. Private owners
law and without just compensation. should be required to deal fairly and
equally with all persons.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2536-37 (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Mabee v. White Plains Publ'g Co., 327 U.S. 178
(1946); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,125 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110 (1942); Labor Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 34-36 (1937)).
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Issue B:
Does an open-housing law force preference or discrimination in favor of
others not of one's own race?
Opponents of Open-Housing Law: Proponents of Open-Housing Law:
By being prohibited from transacting The apparent preference based on race
with a person of one's own race, one may indeed occur, but in fact, the
may be forced into preferring a transaction is not based on
different person, also on the basis of discrimination.
race.
Issue C:
May Congress enact an open-housing law based on the power to regulate
interstate commerce?
Opponents of Open-Housing Law:
If the power over interstate commerce
is-so broad, then all activities may be
regulated; the Framers did not intend
such a broad power, or else they would
not have given specific grants of
power to Congress. States have the
power to regulate private property
within their borders.
Proponents of Open-Housing Law:
Discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing affects interstate commerce by
confining minorities to ghettoes and
reducing the amount of new housing
construction, thus adversely affecting
the flow of building materials and
financing in interstate commerce.
Minorities will be less likely to move
across state lines seeking new
employment. Congress may protect
interstate commerce from adverse
effects, even if the principal motive for
the regulation arises out of some other
moral reason. Regulations affecting
local, individual activities are
acceptable and are constitutional as
long as the effects of such activities on
interstate commerce, taken as a whole,
are present in measurable amounts.
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Issue D:
May Congress enact an open-housing law based on the powers granted in the
Fourteenth Amendment?
Opponents of Open-Housing Law:
The Fourteenth Amendment imposes
restrictions on state action and gives
Congress the power to enforce the
Amendment's provisions. This does
not reach purely private conduct. This
view of congressional power under the
Fourteenth Amendment has been
declared by the Supreme Court and
never overturned.
Proponents of Open-Housing Law:
Congress's power to enforce equal
protection provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes the power to
remove obstacles in the way of
persons securing equal benefits of
government, including prohibiting acts
of private discrimination. The power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment
is enhanced by the power to make all
laws necessary and proper for
executing powers vested by the
Constitution in the federal
government, including objectives
within the scope of the Constitution.
This may include laws affecting
private conduct. Congress may also
enact legislation out of a desire to
correct the evil effects of past
unconstitutionally discriminatory
government action. Justices in
separate, individual opinions in
separate cases have stated their view
that Congress may pass legislation to
prevent interference with Fourteenth
Amendment rights, even if no state
action is involved.
Issue E:
Does prohibiting private acts of discrimination unconstitutionally impair
rights of contract, deprive persons of property without due process of law, or
take property without just compensation?
Opponents of Open-Housing Law:
Restricting rights of preference in the
sale or rental of housing is a
deprivation of rights that impairs
contract rights, deprives one of
property rights without due process of
law, and takes property without just
compensation.
Proponents of Open-Housing Law:
Court decisions have affirmed that
prohibiting private acts of
discrimination does not impair contract
rights, deprive one of property rights
without due process of law, or take
property without just compensation.
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C. Court Decisions on Constitutionality Since Enactment ofthe Fair Housing
Act
Remarkably, there is as yet no authoritative federal judicial pronouncement on
the constitutionality of the FHA provisions regulating purely private conduct.
Moreover, in the few cases that have appeared so far, all of them from lower federal
courts, judges have apparently given no attention to the constitutional arguments
raised in the legislative history of the FHA, but have instead applied their own
independent analysis to the issue or have invoked as precedents prior decisions
produced by such independent analysis.'13 The result is a unanimous judicial
preference for citing the Thirteenth Amendment as the source of constitutional
authority, even though this source on its face can authorize only those FHA
provisions relating to discrimination against African Americans." 4 In this section,
these cases are reviewed, summarized, and analyzed with an attempt to identify
what consensus there may be in this jurisprudence.
1. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
The events of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 5 predated passage of the FHA, so
the complaint against the defendants for a race-based refusal to sell a residence to
plaintiffs was based on the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (now codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982).16 However, applying this provision in this case presented the same issue
as raised by the FHA, that is, whether Congress could regulate purely private
conduct in the sale or rental of housing." 7 The Jones court first held that the
language of § 1982 was broad enough in wording and intent to cover private
conduct.' Then the Court held that Congress has power under the Thirteenth
Amendment "to eradicate conditions that prevent Negroes from buying and renting
property because of their race and color."" 9 This is based on congressional power
to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by appropriate legislation, including the
power to enact laws governing private conduct. 120 While the Thirteenth Amendment
113. This judicial "course correction" is probably a direct result of the decision in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., announced a few weeks after approval of the FHA, which provided a rationale
for applying the Thirteenth Amendment to regulated private conduct. 392 U.S. 409, 438-44 (1968).
See infra Part II.C. I., for a discussion about the Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. decision.
114. One case that adjudicated a claim under the familial status provisions introduced into the
FHA in the 1988 amendments analyzed constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment, but held
that the Fourteenth Amendment provided protection only against state action, not conduct by private
parties. United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 828-29 (D. Nev. 1994).
115. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
116. Id. at 412; see 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994) ("All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.").
117. Jones, 392 U.S. at 412-13.
118. Id. at437.
119. Id. at 438.
120. Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20, 23 (1883)).
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on its own authority, without further legislation, abolished slavery, the
Amendment's enabling clause authorized Congress to pass all laws necessary to
abolish all "badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.''. The Jones court
cited remarks of Senator Trumbull of Illinois, a chief proponent of the Thirteenth
Amendment, explaining that the enabling act was intended to be the means by
which we may "destroy all these discriminations in civil rights against the black
man."In In a strong dissent, Justice Harlan showed convincingly that all proponents
of § 1982, including Senator Trumbull, assumed the Act would apply only to state
action, not to individual action.'2
2. United States v. Hunter
The U.S. Attorney General sued a local newspaper for carrying advertisements
allegedly in violation of the FHA.124 The defendant challenged the constitutionality
of the FHA as so applied." The trial court did not comment on the constitutional
basis of the FHA, 126 but this court declared that the FHA "is a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges and
incidents of slavery."'27 The court found support for this declaration in United
States v. Mitzes, 12 a 1969 FHA case in the District of Maryland.'29 Mintzes relied
on the holding of Jones30 for its view of Thirteenth Amendment authority.' Jones
had ruled that barring even private racial discrimination was a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment. 32 However, the Mintzes
opinion states the FHA is sustainable under the Thirteenth Amendment if its
provisions are a rational means of effectuating the stated policy of the legislation,
which is "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing within the
United States.' 33 The Mintzes court also cited Brown v. State Realty Co., 34 which
it termed the only other reported case on that point. 35 The Brown decision, also
cited by the circuit court in Hunter,36 rejected the Fourteenth Amendment and the
121. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
122. Id. at 440 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 322 (1865-66)).
123. Jones, 392 U.S. at 449-80.
124. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 209 (4th Cir. 1972). The Attorney General based
the violation on § 3604(c) of the FHA, which combats the use of printed materials or advertirements
to discriminate in the sale or rental of homes. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994).
125. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209.
126. See United States v. Hunter, 324 F. Supp. 529, 532-35 (D. Md. 1971).
127. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214.
128. 304 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969).
129. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214.
130. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,413 (1968).
131. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1313.
132. Jones, 392 U.S. at 413.
133. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1313 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994)).
134. 304 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
135. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1313.
136. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214.
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Commerce Clause as sources of constitutional authority for the FHA, but, based on
Jones, accepted the Thirteenth Amendment as validating this exercise of
congressional power.
1
1
7
3. United States v. Real Estate Development Corp.
In this action by the Attorney General alleging racial discrimination at two
apartment buildings, the court stated, "Title VIII [Fair Housing] of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 . . . is an appropriate and constitutionally permissible exercise of
Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to bar all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale and rental of real property. 38
4. United States v. Youritan Construction Co.
In an action granting an injunction against discriminatory conduct by an
apartment owner, the court asserted, "Title VIII [Fair Housing] of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968 . . . is an appropriate and constitutionally permissible exercise of
Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to bar all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale and rental of real property. 9
5. Williams v. Matthews Co.
Individual plaintiffs brought a complaint under both the FHA and the 1866
Civil Right Act against subdivision developers, alleging discrimination in the
defendants' practice of selling subdivision lots only to approved builders. 40 The
court addressed constitutional authority in the following sentence: "Like the 1866
Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Title is an exercise of congressional power under
the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery.'
4'
6. United States v. L & H Land Corp.
In an action against a housing owner for telling black persons that they were not
permitted on the premises, the court introduced its opinion by stating, "The Fair
Housing Act of 1968... is an appropriate and constitutionally permissible exercise
137. Brown, 304 F. Supp. at 1239-40.
138. United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (citing
Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214; Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1313; Brown, 304 F. Supp. at 1240).
139. United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (citing
Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214; Real Estate Dev. Co., 347 F. Supp. at 781; Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1313;
Brown, 304 F. Supp. at 1240).
140. Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 822 (8th Cir. 1974).
141. Id. at 825 (citing Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214; Jones, 392 U.S. at 439).
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of Congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to bar all racial
discrimination, private as well as public, in the rental and sale of real property."' 42
7. Meadows v. Edgewood Management Corp.
In rejecting a claim by apartment managers that they had been dismissed for
refusing to engage in discriminatory rental practices, the court declared, "Title VIII
[FHA] of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. . . is a valid exercise of congressional
power under the [T]hirteenth [A]mendment to eliminate badges and incidents of
slavery."'143 The same court had earlier stated in another FHA case, "The Fair
Housing Act of 1968 is a constitutional exercise of Congressional power under the
Thirteenth Amendment to bar discrimination in housing.""
8. Morgan v. Parcener's Ltd.
In an action brought by a married couple against a defendant who refused to
rent to them, the court declared: "The Fair Housing Act... is a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate the badges and
incidents of slavery. 45
9. United States v. City of Parma
The U.S. Attorney General filed an action against the city of Parma, Ohio, the
largest suburb of Cleveland, accusing it of engaging in a number of acts having the
purpose and effect of maintaining a segregated community."4 The city argued that
applying the FHA to governmental activities of municipalities is unconstitutional,'47
because the U.S. Supreme Court, in National League of Cities v. Usery, 41 held that
the Tenth Amendment prevents Congress from using its Commerce Clause power
to directly displace states' freedom to direct traditional governmental functions.'
49
This court held that the FHA as applied to municipal governmental activities is
based on constitutional authority, 5 ' a holding not directly relevant to the inquiry of
this Article; however, the dicta on which the court rationalized this holding is
relevant. To reach its conclusion, the court reasoned that the FHA was not enacted
142. United States v. L & H Land Corp., 407 F. Supp. 576, 579 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (citing United
States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115,119-21 (5th Cir. 1973); Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214)).
143. Meadows v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., 432 F. Supp. 334, 335 (W.D. Va. 1977) (citing
Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214).
144. United States v. Hughes Mem'l Home, 396 F. Supp. 544, 548 (W.D. Va. 1975) (citing
Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214).
145. Morgan v. Parcener's Ltd., 493 F. Supp. 180, 182 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (citing Williams, 499
F.2d at 819; Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214).
146. United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 564-65 (6th Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 573.
148. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
149. City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 573. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852.
150. City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 573.
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pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but was instead based on the authority of Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment,"5' which declares: "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."'52 The City of Parma court cited
United States v. City ofBlack Jack,'5' as authority for this assertion.'4 The City of
Black Jack court declared that the FHA "was passed pursuant to the congressional
power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eliminate badges and incidents of
slavery."' ' The City ofBlack Jack court supported its statement with a quote from
the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. AlfredH. Mayer Co. construing the Civil Rights
Act of 1866: "[W]hen racial discrimination herds men into ghetto[es] and makes
their ability to buy property turn on the color of their skin, then it too is a relic of
slavery.'
156
The City of Parma court also cited United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty,
Inc. ' as supporting authority."5 8 That case in turn also relied on the Jones rationale
to support the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to
regulate private conduct that is racially discriminatory.159 The Supreme Court in
Jones stated that Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment by
appropriate legislation includes the power to enact laws operating upon the acts of
individuals, whether or not sanctioned by state legislation. 6 The Thirteenth
Amendment's enforcement clause "clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."",16 1 The Bob Lawrence court thus concluded that it should "give
great deference, as indeed it must, to the congressional determination that
[provisions of the Fair Housing Act] will effectuate the purpose of the Thirteenth
Amendment by aiding in the elimination of the 'badges and incidents of slavery in
the United States."" 62 The defendant in that case had "failed to present any
argument that impugns the reasonableness of the congressional determination.'
' 63
The Bob Lawrence court also held that the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress
the power to regulate as commercial speech the various forms of expression
prohibited by the FHA.
64
The Sixth Circuit judges denied a rehearing of the Parma decision, 16' despite
a dissent from the denial that pointed out several significant errors in the court's
151. Id.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
153. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
154. City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 573.
155. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
156. Id. (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,442-43).
157. 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973).
158. City of Parma, 661 F.2d at 573.
159. Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d at 120.
160. Jones, 392 U.S. at 437-39.
161. Id. at 439 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
162. Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d at 120 (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 439).
163. Id. at 121:
164. Id. at 121-22.
165. United States v. City of Parma, 669 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir. 1981).
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recitation of facts and authorities.166 The U.S. Supreme Court denied petition for
writ of certiorari' 67 and petition for rehearing.
168
D. Commentary on the Case Law Regarding Constitutional Authority for
FHA
If, as pronounced in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Thirteenth Amendment
authorizes Congress to legislate against private conduct through the 1866 Civil
Rights Act, 69 then it probably authorizes Congress to legislate against similar
private conduct through the Fair Housing Act. It does not purport to give authority
for Congress to legislate against private discrimination on bases other than race or
against races other than African Americans,"70 thus leaving large portions of the
FHA without any obvious source of authority in the Constitution. Moreover, the
court's view that either the Thirteenth Amendment or the 1866 Civil Rights Act was
intended to reach private conduct is highly questionable. While the Jones decision
may be the current law on this topic, it is probably not good history.
The court's conclusion in United States v. Hunter that the FHA's
constitutionality is based on the Thirteenth Amendment ultimately derives from the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Jones. Relying on the decision of one of its own
lower courts, Hunter also appears to accept the notion that the Thirteenth
Amendment is the only source of constitutional authority for the FHA.
17'
The court's conclusion in United States v. City of Parma that the
constitutionality of the FHA rests on the Thirteenth Amendment is based on a 1974
Eighth Circuit decision and a 1973 Fifth Circuit decision.1 72 Both of these decisions
in turn relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Jones 73 holding that
Congress had power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of slavery
by enacting laws thatproscribe evenprivate conduct, which conductmay be viewed
as badges and incidents of slavery. 74 The Fifth Circuit court acted in deference to
what it called the congressional determination that the FHA would aid in fulfilling
the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment. 75 Here it may be noted that Congress
made no such determination, either in committee hearings, floor debates, or in the
text of the FHA itself;' 76 in all of the references to issues of FHA constitutionality,
166. Id. at 1100-04 (Weick, C.J., dissenting).
167. City of Parma v. United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
168. City of Parma v. United States, 456 U.S. 1012 (1982).
169. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968).
170. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
171. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214 (4th Cir. 1972).
172. United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562, 573 (6th Cir. 1981).
173. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120 (5th Cir. 1973).
174. Jones, 392 U.S. 409, 439-44.
175. Bob Lawrence, 474 F.2d at 120.
176. See supra Part II.B.
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the Thirteenth Amendment was not mentioned. 17 7 If the Thirteenth Amendment is
indeed the constitutional basis for the FHA, then it validly applies only to
discrimination against those who, or whose progenitors, were formerly held in
servitude.
In an odd twist, both the Thirteenth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
have been rejected as sources of constitutional authority for the 1988 familial status
amendments to the FHA,178 and three cases have accepted the Commerce Clause as
the source of authority for these amendments. 79 This raises the possibilities that
different provisions of the FHA have different sources of constitutional authority,
that the authority is not what Congress thought it was, and that courts are forced to
find the answer to this question by way of afterthought and without congressional
guidance.
E. Analysis of the Constitutionality of the FHA Enactment
The standard learning on FHA constitutionality is captured in this summary by
a strong open- housing advocate:
In the field of civil rights and specifically housing discrimination,
the Congress has vast powers emanating from the [T]hirteenth and
[F]ourteenth amendments and, as well, the [C]ommerce [C]lause.
While the [T]hirteenth amendment may extend to the private
market, its coverage is limited to racial discrimination, and
although the [F]ourteenth amendment reaches other victims of
discrimination, its reach is to government-involved conduct or
private activity that interferes with governmentally created
services and facilities; however, the [C]ommerce [C]lause is not
so restrictive.'
177. This type of reasoning is not unusual in the civil rights constitutionality area, as was once
remarked in the early 1960s:
Tracing the origins of the claimed power to pass antidiscrimination legislation
is like playing "This Is the House that Jack Built." A Colorado case relies on a
Massachusetts case, which in turn relies on a California case, which rel[ies] on
two New Jersey cases which rely on a law review article and a U.S. Civil Rights
Commission Report which in turn rely on nothing at all except sheer speculation.
Donald N. Clausen & Richard T. Buck, The Constitutionality of Antidiscrimination Legislation in
Housing in Illinois, in OPEN OCCUPANCY vs. FORCEDHousINGUNDERTHEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT
112, 119-120 (Alfred Avins ed., 1963) (footnotes omitted).
178. United States v. Weiss, 847 F. Supp. 819, 828-29 (D. Nev. 1994).
179. Morgan v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 985 F.2d 1451, 1455 (10th Cir. 1993); Seniors
Civil Liberties Ass'n, Inc. v. Kemp, 965 F.2d 1030, 1033-34 (1 th Cir. 1992); Weiss, 847 F. Supp. at
829.
180. JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HousiNG: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT AND REVITALIZATION 31 (2d ed. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
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This patchwork justification for FHA constitutionality is mostly speculative,
since courts have uniformly relied on only the Thirteenth Amendment, and none of
the so-called sources of constitutional authority is a complete justification for the
full range of FHA provisions.
1. Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment was completely ignored in the Senate debates and
briefs arguing the constitutionality of FHA private conduct provisions."' This is
perhaps best explained by the fact that at that time nothing in Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence suggested it could give constitutional credence to the
FHA. The Thirteenth Amendment in general prohibits slavery and enables
Congress to enforce the prohibition by appropriate legislation:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation."2
Before 1968, the Thirteenth Amendment had neverbeen considered as a source
of congressional authority to regulate private conduct motivated by racial
discrimination. Because the language of the amendment itself, without legislative
reinforcement, suffices to prohibit slavery and involuntary servitude, it has long
been held that the enabling clause in Section 2 empowered Congress to do more.183
Specifically, "that clause clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary
and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United
States.""' Although racial discrimination is considered a badge or incident of
slavery, until 1968 purely private racial discrimination was not considered within
the sweep of the Thirteenth Amendment enabling clause. The participants in the
Amendment's legislative history and subsequent interpretive cases all consistently
considered the enabling clause as directed exclusively to state action."'5
That all changed in June 1968, five months afterpassage of the FHA, when the
U.S. Supreme Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. held that the Thirteenth
Amendment enabling clause could be used by Congress to reach purely private
conduct.' 86 In 1965, the plaintiffs in Jones challenged racially discriminatory private
181. See supra Part II.B.
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
183. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
184. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,439 (1968) (quoting CivilRights Cases, 109
U.S. at 20) (emphasis omitted).
185. Full and persuasive documentation for this conclusion is in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Jones, 392 U.S. at 449-80.
186. Id. at 438-39.
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conduct using 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a provision enacted in 1866 guaranteeing to all
citizens the same right to hold real property as is enjoyed by white citizens. 8 7 The
Court made a disingenuous attempt to reconcile its decision with legislative history
and precedent, but in the end it simply held on its own authority that the enabling
clause of the Thirteenth Amendment authorized Congress to regulate purely private
conduct.'
Announced so soon after passage of the FHA, the Jones decision probably
seemed custom-fitted to answer constitutional challenges of the FHA; not
surprisingly, as described above, every published judicial opinion thereafter
addressing constitutionality of the original FHA provisions, has relied on this
Thirteenth Amendment analysis,'89 even though it clearly was not in the
contemplation of members of Congress who voted for the FHA.' 90
What is surprising is how vulnerable the Thirteenth Amendment argument is
to challenge. The U.S. Supreme Court probably has the power to extend the reach
of the Amendment's enabling clause to cover private conduct, but doing so violates
the legislative intent of Congress, and long-established precedent-and with no
effective reconciliation of the contradiction-may limit the Court's moral and
persuasive authority on this issue. Future justices of a different view would have
little difficulty finding grounds to reject this position.
A type of creeping obsolescence may be built into this position in any event,
since equating discrimination with a badge or incident of servitude loses credibility
with the passage of time from the formal ending of slavery itself. Private
discrimination probably has a life of its own without any identifiable connection to
the victim's former status or heritage of servitude. Other constitutional bases for
challenging discrimination, such as due process or equal protection, are stronger
and more rational, although they are limited to challenges against state action. 9'
Most surprising of all is the exclusive judicial reliance on the Thirteenth
Amendment as authority for the original provisions of the FHA,' 92 when the
Amendment can relate only to discrimination against African Americans. 93 This
raises the possibility that courts would seek other sources of constitutional authority
if actions were brought for other types of discrimination. It also suggests that the
other types of discrimination are minor, perhaps trivial, problems compared to
discrimination against African Americans. All of this seems to be an odd and
187. Id. at 412, 422; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1994).
188. Jones, 392 U.S. at 423-44.
189. See supra Part II.C.
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. See Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1239-40 (1969).
192. Other sources of constitutionality have been invoked for discrimination categories added
later by amendment. See, e.g., Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192,200-17 (5th Cir.
2000) (citing the Commerce Clause as constitutional authority for the Fair Housing Amendments Act).
193. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. Once the Jones court invoked the Thirteenth Amendment
as the source of FHA constitutional authority, analysis ceased and federal courts simply recited the
point as an established conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096,
1100-01 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing Congress's power under the Thirteenth Amendment to act in
eradicating racial discrimination).
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unacceptable way to address the constitutionality of legislation that introduced a
remarkable, far-reaching, and unprecedented regulation of private property rights.
In summary, the Thirteenth Amendment is neither sufficient nor acceptable as
the source of constitutional authority for the original provisions of the FHA
proscribing purely private conduct for the following reasons:
A. Prohibiting discrimination under the Thirteenth Amendment because the
discrimination is supposedly abadge or incident of slavery is no longer realistic
or rational. Other sources of authority to reach discrimination are available.
B. Extending the Thirteenth Amendment's enabling clause to reach private
conduct is a judicial fiction created in 1968, contrary to the intent of the
Amendment's drafters and to all prior judicial interpretations.
C. The Thirteenth Amendment is at best only uncertain authority to reach
discrimination against African Americans and is no authority at all for
prohibiting other kinds of discrimination.
D. The Thirteenth Amendment was not considered by Congress as its authority for
enacting the FHA, so its invocation by the courts is another judicial fiction; this
judicial approach represents at once both an inappropriate usurpation of
legislative authority and a failure to exercise judicial power to scrutinize
legislation for proper constitutional authority.
2. Fourteenth Amendment
No reported court decision has cited the Fourteenth Amendment as
constitutional authority for the private conduct prohibitions of the FHA. Perhaps the
most obvious reason for this lack of attention is the fact that the Amendment on its
face applies only to state action, as is manifest in the language of Section 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'94
Undeterred by this barrier, proponents of the FHA in the Senate offered the
theory that the Fourteenth Amendment's enabling clause extends the Amendment's
reach into private conduct: 95 "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."' 196 This notion is reinforced,
they argued, by the Necessary and Proper Clause, applicable to the entire
Constitution'97 : "The Congress shall have Power... [tio make all Laws which
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
195. See supra Part II.B.3.
196. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
197. See supra Part ll.B.3.
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shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."'
198
Senators who promoted the FHA considered the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause, as enforced through the Amendment's enabling clause, as
the main source of constitutional authority for the FHA.' 99 This viewpoint, as
explained in the documents inserted into the Congressional Record during the
Senate debate, needs to be examined more closely.
The principal case cited for this point of view, Katzenbach v. Morgan,20 is of
dubious relevance to the FHA. In that case the Supreme Court struck down a state
English literacy requirement for voting as violating the 1965 Voting Rights Act;
201
the Act exemplified Congress's enabling powers to carry out the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2"2 The state argued that the enabling
legislation directed at prohibiting specific state practices would be appropriate only
if a court had previously decided that the targeted practice was forbidden by the
Equal Protection Clause. 3 In rejecting this novel notion that enabling legislation
must be conditioned on prior judicial findings, the Katzenbach Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment enabling clause granted "to Congress... the same broad
powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause. 20 4 The leading description
of the reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause was stated by Chief Justice John
Marshall: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [C]onstitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the [C]onstitution, are
constitutional. 2 5
A similar description of the Fourteenth Amendment's enabling clause was
given by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1879, just 12 years after the Amendment was
adopted:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry
out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure
to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and
the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion,
if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional
power.
20 6
198. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
199. See supra Part II.B.3.
200. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
201. Id. at 646-47.
202. Id. at 646.
203. Id. at 648.
204. Id. at 650.
205. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
206. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
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The Katzenbach Court declared that the "McCulloch v. Maryland standard is
the measure of what constitutes 'appropriate legislation' under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 20 7 or, in the words of the Katzenbach Court, the enabling clause
authorizes "Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what
legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."20 The
Court emphasized "that Congress' power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures
to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment.
'20 9
This Amendment on its face applies only to "state action." The Katzenbach
Court adopted the view that the enabling clause authorized legislation that would
secure equal protection of the laws "against State denial or invasion. ' 210 The issues
in Katzenbach were not concerned with regulating private conduct. Neither
Katzenbach nor any otherjudicial precedent citedby the FHAproponents purported
to authorize any legislation regulating purely private conduct under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, one authority inserted by proponents into the debate record
categorically reaffirms that at least some state involvement, or threshold level of
state action, is required for regulating legislation to come within the reach of the
Equal Protection Clause.21'
Today, advocates of open housing simply recite the categorical conclusion that
the Fourteenth Amendment may reach private conduct:
Congress, as a means to enforce the [A]mendment, may choose
to eliminate the state action requirement where private parties are
interfering with rights protectedby the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment
such as access to public facilities or with the exercise of
fundamental rights. Private conduct may also be regulated where
uniform enforcement is critical to effective enforcement or where
discrimination in the private market is so pervasive that it
constitutes an effective bar to the discriminated class' [] exercising
protected [F]ourteenth [A]mendment rights.212
FHA proponents in fact advanced a novel interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's enabling clause in order to justify regulation of purely private
conduct. Even though this new interpretation lacked the judicial precedent claimed
for it, it should still be examined. According to this view, Congress has the power
to enact a law
to remove obstacles in the way of persons' securing the equal
benefits of government-benefits which a State could not
207. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651.
208. Id.
209. Id. at651 n.10.
210. Id. at 650 (quoting Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 346).
211. See 114 CONG.REc. 2273 (1968) (citingUnited States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,755 (1966)).
212. KUSHNER, supra note 180, at 27 (footnotes omitted).
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discriminatorily deny them without violating the Clause itself. A
law prohibiting discrimination in housing on account of race,
color, religion or national origin is such a law because
discrimination in housing forces its victims to live in segregated
areas, or "ghettoes," and the benefits of government are less
available in ghettoes.213
To state this interpretation in more direct terms, a state's failure to prohibit
private conduct that may inhibit a person's access to governmental benefits is a
denial of equal protection of the laws. This is an opinion that deserves respect. The
approach is not irrational on its face.214 It is likely motivated by honorable
intentions, and may be thought to be a necessary measure in the face of persistent
and widespread private discriminatory conduct. On the other hand, it is a point of
view lacking the support of the Constitution, either from the language of the
Constitution or from judicial interpretations of that language.21 Moreover, if this
approach is adopted as the standard for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's
enabling clause, it will effectively remove all restraints on Congress's power to
regulate private conduct. This would seem to be well beyond the "letter and spirit
of the [C]onstitution" that informed Marshall's view of the enabling clause's
reach. 16 It is also a view that seems characterized by an attitude that the
Constitution is merely an obstacle to be overcome in progressing toward a laudable
social goal, rather than a guide to good governmental practices that, with patience
and wisdom, can achieve the same ends.
Among the restraints that this approach could remove from Congress's power
to regulate private conduct is the restraint that the power to prohibit does not
necessarily infer the power to require affirmatively. An early critic of "affirmative
action" pointed out the strained rationale by which the civil rights decisions moved
from prohibiting segregation to requiring integration;2 17 under the view of the
213. 114 CONG. REC. 2273 (1968) (citations omitted).
214. Some may question the factual premises of FHA proponents who advanced this view;
whether private discriminatory conduct actually "forces" its victims to live in ghettoes, or whether
living in so-called ghettoes causes reduced access to government benefits, or whether unequal access
(as distinguished from unequal right of access) to government benefits amounts to a constitutional
denial of equal protection of the laws. All are propositions that could be vigorously debated, however,
for the purpose of this discussion, the validity of these propositions is accepted.
215. See Chapman v. Higbee Co., 256 F.3d 416, 420-21 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the federal
civil rights statute granting to all persons full and equal benefit of the laws does not protect against
private discrimination, only against state action).
216. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
217. See Lino A. Graglia, The "Remedy" Rationale for Requiring or Permitting Otherwise
Prohibited Discrimination: How the Court Overcame the Constitution and the 1964 CivilRights Act,
22 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 569, 569 (1988). FHA proponents openly proclaim that their objective is to
not only eliminate discrimination but also to create an open, fully integrated society. See Margalynne
Armstrong, Race and Property Values in Entrenched Segregation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1051, 1053
(1998); Calmore, supra note 7, at 1070-71; Richard H. Sander, Housing Segregation and Housing
Integration: The Diverging Paths of Urban America, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 977, 1009-10 (1998).
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Fourteenth Amendment discussed in this section, no judicial doctrine would inhibit
that same process from occurring in housing.
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment offers no support for the provisions of
the FHA that purport to regulate purely private conduct.
3. Commerce Clause
FHA proponents also found constitutional support for the legislation in the
Commerce Clause: "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce... among the several States .. . ."2"' Again, no court has yet adopted
this theory of constitutional authority for the FHA, so the best and only statement
of the theory available for examination is that found in the record of the Senate
debates,219 including the written statements inserted into the record.2"
According to these statements, several factual and legal arguments support
enactment of the FHA's private conduct restrictions as falling within Congress's
power to regulate commerce among the states. These may be summarized as
follows:
Factual Arguments
A. Housing is a significant element of interstate commerce, considering the
amounts of building materials crossing state lines, the interstate financing
transactions, and the fact that every year one family in thirty moves to a
different state."'
B. Discrimination in housing adversely affects interstate commerce by reducing
the number of new homes that are built and the amount of interstate movement
of materials and financing. Interstate movement of minority families and
efficient allocation of their labor is discouraged by discrimination.'
Legal Arguments
A. The Commerce Clause grants Congress plenary power to protect interstate
commerce from adverse effects such as those described above.'m The power is
not restricted just to goods or persons in transit; it extends to any and all
activities which affect interstate commerce, even if the goods or persons
engaged in the activities are not then, or may never be, traveling in
commerce.2
4
218. U.S. CONST. art. , § 8.
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See supra Part H.B.3.
221. 114 CONG. REC. 2536 (1968).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2536-37.
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B. The congressional power to regulate interstate commerce exists even when the
adverse effects to be regulated are minor, or if taken individually, the effects
would be insignificant; it is sufficient if the effects, taken as a whole, are
present in measurable amounts."25
C. It does not matter that when Congress exercises its power under the Commerce
Clause its motives are not solely to protect commerce; it can as validly act for
moral reasonsY 6
With respect to the factual elements of this argument, the facts themselves are
generally not in dispute. Nor is it disputable that the housing sector of the economy
is truly interstate in scope, so that matters affecting housing or affected by housing
are arguably matters of interstate commerce. What may be subject to question is
whether the invocation of the Commerce Clause as a source of regulatory power for
Congress should be based on such an industry-wide perspective, or whether
Congress's power is defined by the specific conduct targeted for regulation. This
inquiry leads to the legal arguments summarized above.
The first of those legal arguments is that Congress may act to protect interstate
commerce from the adverse effects introduced by private discriminatory conduct
in the sale or rental of housing. The goods or persons which are the object of the
regulation need not be in transit or traveling in commerce.227 Cited in support for
these propositions is, among other cases, Katzenbach v. McClung, 8 in which
Congress's power to ban racial discrimination from restaurants was challenged. "
The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Congress, in exercising its power over
interstate commerce, could validly ban racial discrimination in restaurants "which
serve food a substantial portion of which has moved in commerce.''3' This power
can be asserted even over individual establishments whose involvement in interstate
commerce would be considered insignificant, because those activities may typify
the activities of many other similar establishments, which together might bring far-
reaching harm to interstate commerce.23'
In a companion case, Heart ofAtlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,2 2 the Court
upheld Congress's interstate commerce power to ban discrimination in public
accommodations, emphasizing that even local accommodations could be regulated
if their cumulative activities might have a substantial and harmful effect on
interstate commerce.23' Moreover, the valid exercise of the commerce power
225. Id. at 2537.
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
228. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
229. Id. at 295.
230. Id. at 298, 304-05.
231. See id. at 300-01.
232. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
233. Id. at 258.
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precluded a countering claim under the Fifth Amendment that the defendant had
been deprived of liberty or property without just compensation. M
The Heart of Atlanta Court further declared that interstate commerce can be
regulated by statutes which also have a moral purpose: "That Congress was
legislating against moral wrongs in many of these areas rendered its enactments no
less valid." 5
In neither of these cases nor in similar cases did the Supreme Court require that
Congress make any findings about the effects of the targeted activities on interstate
commerce, in order to validate the regulation. Instead, if the courts have been able
themselves to make the findings they might have required of Congress, establishing
such a connection between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, then it
can be said, even by way of afterthought, that such regulation was within
Congress's commerce power.2
The favorable impact of these rulings on the constitutionality of the FHA
private conduct restrictions may have been considerably weakened in the 1995 case
of United States v. Lopez.2 7 When Congress attempted to impose criminal penalties
for possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, the U.S. Supreme Court
held the legislation to be beyond the commerce power."28 The Court rejected
arguments showing the impact of violent crime on interstate commerce, because
those arguments would justify federal regulation of all violent crime and any
activities that related to the economic productivity of citizens, including marriage
and divorce."S The criminal regulation was distinguished from the regulation of
activities connected with a commercial transaction, and it was not an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity "in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."2 The Court also noted
the absence of congressional findings demonstrating the connection between the
legislation and interstate commerce, although such findings had not been previously
required, and asserted that such findings would assist the Court in "evaluat[ing] the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce." 41 After the Lopez case first arose, Congress quickly amended the
firearms law to include the requested findings about connections to interstate
commerce, but the Supreme Court was not impressed with this post-hoc attempt to
validate the law.242
234. Id.
235. Id. at 257.
236. Cf. Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUIKEL.J. 1169, 1176-77 (2001) (noting that there is "reason to doubt that
the Court assumes Congress to be a reliable factfinder").
237. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
238. Id. at 551.
239. Id. at 563-64.
240. Id. at 561.
241. Id. at 562-63.
242. See id. at 563 n.4; see also Devins, supra note 236, at 1195-96 (citing the quickly added
amendment as an example of Congress not taking factfinding seriously on federalism issues).
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In 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court altered another Commerce Clause rule by
declaring that a regulation within the commerce power that also affects property
interests may trigger rights in the property owner to just compensation for a taking
under the Fifth Amendment.243 This reversed a position adopted twenty-six years
earlier in Heart ofAtlanta. 4
Whether the precedential authority is strong or weak, that issue should not deter
examination of the more important inquiry: Does this enormous expansion of
federal power make sense? As finally conceded by the Supreme Court in Lopez,
these cases essentially allow Congress to regulate any activity related to citizens'
economic productivity. 4 Even allowing for the vastly increased economic
interdependence that has arisen since the late eighteenth century, which could
conceivably justify an expanded federal regulatory power, would not the genius of
the Constitution still demand some restraint on the central government? At the
moment, the more extreme interpretations of the Commerce Clause impose no limit
on Congress's power to regulate citizens' lives, including the power to sharply
curtail a property owner's right to dispose of the property.
Easily overlooked in this entire discussion is the self-evident fact that non-race-
based discrimination in the sale or rental of housing is too rare to have any
discernible impact on interstate commerce, even under the most exaggerated view
of that term.
III. ARE SOME PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT POSSIBLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN THEIR APPLICATION?
The preceding discussion addresses the question of whether portions of the
FHA are unconstitutional on their face, or in other words, whether Congress lacked
constitutional authority to enact those provisions. Regardless of how that question
is resolved, or even if it is resolved in favor of constitutionality, the FHA might still
be unconstitutional when applied in individual cases. The discussion of this issue,
as with the preceding discussion, focuses on provisions of the FHA that deal with
private conduct.
A. Takings Conflicts
The limitation of the right to dispose of one's property has traditionally been
treated as a "police power" regulation, which is not subject to the "just
compensation" requirement, rather than as a "taking," for which compensation is
constitutionally required.246 The concept of state police power does not appear in
243. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).
244. 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964).
245. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
246. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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the Constitution but was recognized by early American courts and legal scholars.247
The flavor of their writings is captured in two attempts at defining police power.
The first attempt, made by James Kent, provided that:
The government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses
of property as would create nuisances, and become dangerous to
the lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens ... on the
general or rational principle, that every person ought so to use his
property as not to injure his neighbors, and that private interests
must be made subservient to the general interests of the
community.
248
Thomas Cooley, in the second attempt, defined police power by stating:
The police of a State, in a comprehensive sense, embraces its
system of internal regulation, by which it is sought not only to
preserve the public order and to prevent offences against the State,
but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen
those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are
calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the
uninterrupted enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably
consistent with a like enjoyment of rights by others.249
In recent years the pressure exerted by governments at all levels on various
private property rights has grown, resulting in frequent complaints that some
regulations go beyond the bounds of police power.2"0 When that happens, then it is
said that the governmental entity has actually taken a private property interest by
means of a too vigorous regulation, and that this "taking" should generate a Fifth
Amendment right to just compensation for the property owner. An enormous
jurisprudence and body of legal literature has sprung up, seeking to rationalize
"takings"; the very mass of these printed works defies summary and evaluation.2 "
However, in 1990 theU.S. Supreme CourtinPreseault v. Interstate Commerce
Commission 2 added another element to the debate by declaring that a federal
regulation permissible under the commerce power, but which also affects property
interests, may trigger rights in the property owner to just compensation for a taking
247. See David A. Thomas, Sources of Government Police Power, in 8 THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY: THOMAS ED. 380-87 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
248. 2 JAMESKENT, COMMENTARIES ONAMERICANLAW 534 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896).
249. THOMAS COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTiTUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 630 (2d ed. 1871).
250. See generally Robert S. Payne, The Current State ofRegulatory Takings in Supreme Court
Jurisprudence: A Look at City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 11 VILL. ENVTL.
L. 349, 390-91 (2000) (describing current trends in "Takings" jurisprudence).
251. For perhaps the most perceptive and accessible summary analysis of current takings
jurisprudence, see id. at 381-91.
252. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
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under the Fifth Amendment." 3 This reversed a position adopted twenty-six years
earlier in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States."' If the plain language of
the Preseault decision were to be applied in an FHA case, a taking could easily
result, especially where the prohibited discrimination did not correspond to any
compelling social problem on which a significant state interest rested.
B. Free Speech Conflicts
The FHA prohibitions that raise free speech issues are extremely broad:
[I]t shall be unlawful-
(c) [t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or
published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to
the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference,
limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to
make any such preference, limitation, or discrimination."
One can imagine innumerable scenarios in which the literal application of these
provisions would create obvious and significant infringements on personal free
speech rights. For instance, a private person, under these provisions, is prohibited
from making any statement that indicates an intention to make a discriminatory
preference in the sale or rental of housing-for example, to prefer a buyer sharing
the seller's religion or national origin-even if such intention is never carried out.
The broad excesses of these provisions have never been meaningfully challenged
in the courts. However, the provisions have been tested and approved in a very
narrow application-the liability of newspapers for publishing discriminatory
advertisements.
In Ragin v. New York Times Co.,256 the newspaper was accused of expressing
racial preference in publishing its customers' advertisements for housing by having
used almost exclusively white models ever since the FHA was passed in 1968.257
Among other defenses, the newspaper averred that holding it liable would violate
the First Amendment?" However, the court characterized the newspaper's activities
as commercial speech, which is accorded less constitutional protectionY 9
Moreover, the commercial speech related to an illegal activity, namely, unlawful
discrimination in the sale or rental of housing.2 6° The newspaper protested that its
253. Id. at 4-5.
254. 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1994).
256. 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
257. Id. at 998.
258. Id. at 1002.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1002-03.
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activity was the legal activity of the sale or rental of housing, and that it was made
illegal only by the statute whose constitutionality was in question.6 ' The court
rejected this argument against circularity with another circularity:
Such circularity would exist only if there were doubt about
Congress's power to prohibit speech that directly furthers
discriminatory sales or rentals of housing. The Times
understandably shrinks from such a bold and fruitless challenge
to the Fair Housing Act. Given that Congress's power to prohibit
such speech is unquestioned, reliance upon the statute to
determine the illegality of ads with a racial message is not circular
but inexorable.262
Unfortunately, the court failed to perceive that it was indeed being invited to
examine Congress's power to prohibit such speech, and instead-and in place of
any analysis-substituted its own strong statement of bias. Therefore, this case
stands for the proposition that the FHA advertising prohibitions do not violate First
Amendment rights, but that position is taken utterly without any reasoning or
analysis.
A more responsible attempt at analyzing this question appeared in the
previously discussed case of United States v. Hunter.263 The plaintiff in this case
also attacked the newspaper publication of discriminatory advertisements for the
sale or rental of housing, and the newspaper argued that the prohibition violated
freedom of the press under the First Amendment.264 The Hunter court also denied
constitutional protection for what it characterized as purely commercial advertising,
thus tacitly approving Congress's act making some of those activities illegal;
however, the court noted, without analysis of constitutionality, that the FHA also
bars private publication of discriminatory advertisements. 6 '
Thus, the Hunter court upheld the FHA's restrictions on freedom of the press,
because those freedoms as they relate to commercial advertising are not entitled to
full First Amendment protection.266 The Hunter court did not address the question
of whether those prohibitions were constitutional when applied in any other context.
It should be recalled, as discussed in an earlier section of this Article, 267 that the
Hunter court asserted that Congress's power to enact the FHA is based on the
Thirteenth Amendment,268 which can provide a constitutional justification for the
FHA only as it relates to discrimination against African Americans.269 Therefore,
261. Id. at 1002.
262. Ragin, 923 F.2d at 1003.
263. 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of this case, see supra Part I.C.2.
264. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 209.
265. Id. at212-13.
266. Id. at 211.
267. See supra Part I.C.2.
268. Hunter, 459 F.2d at 214.
269. See supra Part II.D.
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if the Hunter court were to confront discriminatory practices in the sale or rental of
housing based on any other form of discrimination, it would have to either find
some other constitutional source for congressional power to prohibit those practices
or concede that those prohibitions were unconstitutional.270 If such non-African
American discrimination is indeed beyond Congress's power to prohibit, then the
various restrictions on First Amendment expression are also beyond Congress's
power.
Courts' reluctance to candidly analyze the FHA restrictions of expression is
surprising, given the unique nature and breadth of those restrictions. Violations of
the FHA are declared to be unlawful2 7' and the relief that can be granted against
violators consists of injunctions and compensatory and punitive damages, 27 2 all civil
rather than criminal penalties. Except in the context of "hate" speech, and attempts
to violently overthrow the government (both of which are criminal activities),2 73 the
FHA is unique in prohibiting and penalizing the mere expressions of intent to
violate the law, even if the violations do not actually occur. Some forms of
expression, such as flag-burning, have been upheld even in the face of existing
criminal prohibitions.274
In other areas of property law, such as expressing intent to trespass on a
neighbor's land, or expressing intent to create a private nuisance, or expressing
intent to not return a security deposit for an invalid reason, no such restrictions exist
or could conceivably be considered constitutional. Why such restrictions in the
housing context should be considered valid, and exempt from scrutiny, is beyond
explanation. Even if one considers the heightened concern over racial matters to be
sufficient justification, that does nothing to justify these free speech restrictions as
applied to all of the other forms of discrimination prohibited under the FHA.27 1 If
the expression restrictions are considered justifiable because the expressions deter
persons from pursuing their rights to rent or buy, then the scope of the restrictions
should be evaluated against the severity of the problem. Moreover, even if one were
270. Even proponents of the FHA concede that the constitutionality of the FHA from a free
speech perspective remains an open question:
By its terms, [the FHA] does ban certain types of speech .... For now, it is
sufficient to note that the issue of whether discriminatory statements may be
defended on First Amendment grounds remains a lively one. The two circuits
that have addressed this issue have rejected the freedom of speech defense, but
they did so in the early 1970s on the ground that the defendants' speech, being
merely commercial, was not entitled to much First Amendmentprotection. These
precedents may be suspect today in light of recent Supreme Court decisions
heightening the degree of First Amendment protection accorded commercial
speech, including one that protected home selling techniques.
ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW 37-38 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
272. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612(k), 3613(c), 3614(d) (1994).
273. See UTAH CODEANN. § 76-3-203.3 (1999).
274. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
275. See Lee, supra note 6, at 1223 (discussing HUD investigations which target neighborhood
and community organizations challenging the placement of public housing in certain areas).
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to apply the mildest form of scrutiny to validate state regulation of private conduct,
the so-called rational basis test, one would be hard-pressed to find in those other
forms of prohibited discrimination such serious and widespread social disorders as
to justify such sweeping speech restrictions.
C. Religious Exercise Conflicts
The FHA currently permits religious organizations to prefer their own
members' occupancy in dwellings owned by the organizations, but makes no other
concessions to free exercise of religion.276 Thus, an owner who wishes to prefer a
member of the owner's faith as a renter or purchaser, or wishes to deny renting or
selling to someone whose conduct offends the owner's religious standards, may be
found in violation of the FHA, even if those preferences are simply expressed but
not carried out.277 Whether an exemption for religious preferences may be approved
has been tested most often in state courts in the context of state laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of marital status. Courts have given mixed reactions to
whether a landlord can refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because of the
landlord's religious belief that such cohabitation is sinful.27
No published writing has reviewed the extent of religious discrimination in the
sale and rental of housing or suggested that religious discrimination has any
significance at all in the housing sector of the economy. The somewhat Draconian
restrictions the FHA places on free exercise, as well as on the other lesser forms of
discrimination, are perhaps best explained by the FHA's proponents' hopes that the
FHA would be a major step in the forcible cleansing of our society of all of its
major ills, with private prejudice and discrimination at the top of the list.279 This
may also explain why the FHA makes no distinction between the various types of
prohibited discrimination, which under our current jurisprudence are subject to
different levels of scrutiny in assessing their constitutionality.
IV. SUMMARY OF FHA CONSTITUTIONALITYISSUBS AND A PROPOSED CORRECTION
A. Summary of FHA Constitutionality Issues
Questioning the constitutionality of the FHA's private conduct provisions can
be difficult for some people. For them-the Senate in 1968, the court in Ragin v.
276. 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1994).
277. See id. (applying only to religious organizations).
278. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000)
(vacating district court opinion as not ripe for review because the landlord's action was commenced
before enforcement proceedings began; this opinion expressed hostility to the landlord's position);
Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 243 (Mass. 1994) (remanding the case to determine if
landlord's religious belief creates an exception to liability); Donahue v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n.,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,46 (Ct. App. 1991) (exempting the landlord from liability because refusal to rent
was based on sincerely held religious belief).
279. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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New York Times Co.,28 and perhaps the majority of Americans-it is unthinkable
that Congress would not have the power to proscribe racial discrimination and
other, similar forms of negative social behavior. Perhaps that is why these issues
have never been squarely confronted. And if not confronting these issues has been
acceptable since 1968, why raise them now?
Perhaps the best reason for raising the constitutionality question now, is that
any departures from constitutional restraints, regardless of how innocuous or
acceptable at the time, lower the bar to similar departures at different times and in
perhaps less acceptable ways. Thus, if the federal government can prohibit and
punish the type of private conduct targeted in the FHA, then any other type of
private conduct on someone's social agenda is similarly vulnerable. Indeed, these
kinds of excesses are immediately discernible in the FHA itself, which prohibits
whole areas of private conduct (e.g., gender, religion, national origin) which in the
housing sector have never been large social problems and for which no shred of
constitutional justification exists. No doubt can exist that the federal government
has authority to govern any of these activities if facilitated by "state action"; in all
of these matters, at the very least, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment commands such protection.
Below is a summary of the points on which the original private conduct
portions of the FHA may be vulnerable to constitutional challenge:
A. The Act itself contains no statement of Congress's constitutional authority for
such legislation, only a statement of policy that it is intended to function within
constitutional limitations."'
B. Constitutionality issues were raisedbriefly in Senate debates precedingpassage
of the Act, but were not included in committee reports or other legislative
history. Opposing positions were noted for the record, without any consensus
or majority position being adopted, except inferentially by passage of the FHA
itself.
28 2
C. The constitutional authority cited by FHA proponents during the debates has
been completely ignored by the courts.83 Never having been considered by the
courts, that theory of authority has never been subjected to adversarial
advocacy and judicial analysis. When examined today, it is seen that that theory
rests on an extreme and partially discredited notion of Commerce Clause
power.28 4
D. The few federal courts that have examined the constitutionality of the FHA
have justified it on Congress's power under the Thirteenth Amendment, also
by flawed reasoning.25 This power was applied to private conduct only because
280. 923 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991). For a discussion of this case, see supra Part III.B.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
282. See supra Part II.B.
283. See supra Part II.C.
284. See supra Part II.B.
285. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
[Vol. 53: 7
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss1/4
FAIR HOUSING ACT
of the 1968 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.216 decision introducing a new,
expanded interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment's enabling clause, an
interpretation based on a completely erroneous view of the legislative history
underlying the Thirteenth Amendment.287 Even if the Jones jurisprudence were
accepted, it would sustain the FHA only as applied to African Americans. 288 No
specific constitutional authority has ever been cited by a federal court for any
other aspect of the FHA private conduct provisions.289
E. The FHA eradicates certain private property rights, and current jurisprudence
suggests that, even if the FHA is constitutionally permissible, its enforcement
could create regulatory takings for which private landowners could be
compensated.29' To raise takings issues is a reminder that the FHA directly
infringes upon private property rights, the significance of which has never been
analyzed by federal courts.
F. FHA private conduct provisions restrict First Amendment free speech rights in
ways unprecedented in any other federal legislation.29' Courts that have rejected
free speech challenges have not analyzed the issues, but only issued conclusory
remarks.292
G. Among other possible conflicts, application of FHA restrictions on private
conduct may interfere with First Amendment free exercise of religion rights.293
So far this issue has arisen mostly in the context of state open-housing laws
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status, but it could easily arise
under the federal FHA familial status provision, with respect either to
unmarried couples or to same sex couples. State court decisions suggest that
free exercise rights could render offending portions of open-housing laws
unconstitutional.294
B. A Proposed Minimalist Corrective to the Federal FHLA
If two persons representing opposing views on the constitutionality of the FHA
private conduct provisions were placed in a room with each other and told to work
out their differences, an interesting and instructive scenario might take place. First,
each protagonist would have to recognize both merit and sincerity in the other point
of view. The FHA opponent would have to acknowledge that more open housing
and less racial prejudice at the personal level are desirable goals and may seem
unattainable without government intervention; however, the opponent would insist
that the government efforts to achieve these goals must be attempted within the
286. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
287. See supra Parts II.C.1, II.D.
288. See supra Part II.D.
289. See supra Parts II.C, II.D.
290. See supra Part III.A.
291. See supra Part Ill.B.
292. See supra Part II.B.
293. See supra Part Im.C.
294. See supra Part mI.C.
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government's legitimate sphere of authority. The FHA proponent would have to
concede that the national government is not supposed to be all-powerful and that
people can honestly differ on what constitutes an ideal society; the proponent would
be eager to pursue these ideals in any lawful way. In time, they could perhaps
compose their differences by agreeing to undertake two steps. One step would be
to introduce a small amendment into the FHA that would eliminate its objectionable
features relating to expanded governmental power or excessive intrusion in private
conduct. The other step would be to invoke existing rules of law-indeed, even the
common law in the states-to achieve open-housing regimes that are secure from
legal attack. The proposed FHA amendment is explained in the following
paragraph. The new proposal for achieving open housing within common law
principles already effective in states' property laws is explained in Part V of this
Article.
If the private conduct provisions of the FHA are both vulnerable to
constitutional challenge and represent the most extreme federal governmental
interference with private property rights, then the Act could be amended to
eliminate those provisions, leaving in place all current FHA language, but declaring
that those provisions apply only to state action. Indeed the FHA was intended not
only to correct prejudicial private conduct but also discriminatory state action,
which in the housing sector was quite widespread during the 1940s, 1950s, and
1960s. Limiting the FHA to state action only, in order to correct constitutional flaws
in the FHA, can be achieved simply by adding the phrase "as a matter of state
action" to the phrase "it shall be unlawful" in the opening lines of § 3604 of the
FHA, the provisions describing most of the prohibited conduct.295 This would then
leave the regulation of private conduct to the states in accordance with their
fundamental common law property principles, as explained in Part V of this Article.
V. A NEW APPROACH TO HOUSING FAIRNESS: USE OF COMMON LAW PROPERTY
LAW RULES TO ACHIEVE HOUSING FREE OF PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION
A. Reliance on State Rather Than Federal Law
Beginning in the 1950s, states began enacting their own open-housing
legislation.296 This continued after enactment of the federal FHA in 1968, and now
48 states and the District of Columbia have some type of open-housing
legislation.297
295. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1994).
296. See ROBERTG. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND LITIGATION § 3.5 (1992).
297. See ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (2000); ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 2000); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 41-1491.14 (1956); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-204 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2001); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-502 (2000); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-58'- 46a-64a (1958 & Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (1999); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.23 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 8-3-202
(1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 2000); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (Michie 1949); 775
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-102 (West 1993); IND.CODEANN. § 22-9.5-5-1 (Michie 1997); IOWACODE
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As described by one legal scholar:
Although varying in details, state enforcement schemes
resemble the federal scheme and each other in several respects.
First, all states provide for some administrative mechanism to
receive, investigate and possibly resolve discrimination
complaints. In most states this includes a commission or some
other body to conduct hearings and order appropriate relief.
Second, states typically also provide for a private civil action for
alleged discriminatory conduct.
State statutes have also expanded protection in several
important respects, however. Some state statutes, unlike the Fair
Housing Act, extend coverage to all real property and not just
residential dwellings. Also, some states have extended protection
to more classes than does the federal scheme. Marital status is
protected in twenty states, age in nine states, source of income in
four states, and sexual orientation in four states and the District of
Columbia.298
If federal prohibitions of discrimination in housing were limited to instances of
"state action," as proposed in the preceding section, 99 then these state open-housing
laws would be the principal, if not only, means of regulating private conduct
deemed discriminatory. Indeed, state regulation may be preferable to and more
ANN. § 216.8 (West 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1016 (2000); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.360
(Michie 1997); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 51:2606 (West Supp. 2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582
(West 1964 & Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN. OF 1957 art. 49B § 22 (1998 & Supp. 2000); MASS. GEN.
LAWSANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996 & Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWsANN. § 37.2502 (West 1985
& Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.040
(West 1996 & Supp. 2001); MONT. CODEANN. § 49-2-305 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-318 (1997);
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.100 (Michie 1998); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1995 & Supp.
2000);NJ. STAT.ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (Michie 1978
& Supp. 2001); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (1999); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1997); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (Anderson 1998); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, § 1452 (West 1987 & Supp. 2001); OR.REv.STAT. § 659.033 (1999); 43 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 953 (West 1991 & Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 34-37-4 (1995 & Supp. 2000); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 31-21-40 (Law. Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-20 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 4-21-601 (1998); TEX. PROP. CODEANN. § 301.021 (Vernon 1995); UTAHCODEANN. § 57-21-
5 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (1993); VA. CODEANN. § 36-96.3 (Michie 1996); WASH. REV.
CODEANN. § 49.60.222 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001); W. VA. CODEANN. § 5-11-9 (Michie 1999); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 106.04 (West 1997).
298. Mark W. Cordes, StatutoryModifications ofLandlord and Tenant Law, in 5 THOMPSONON
REALPROPERTY: THOMASED. 305-06 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994 & Supp. 2000) (footnotes omitted).
For examples of state statutes that extended coverage to all real property and not just residential
dwellings see ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-58 (1958 &
Supp. 2001); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515-3 (Michie 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1991
& Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1995 & Supp. 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033
(1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-20 (Michie 1995).
299. See supra Part IV.B.
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secure than federal regulation. Federal regulation of private housing necessarily
rests only on the terms of the Commerce Clause and only on relatively recent and
novel interpretations of that clause. On the other hand, state police powers to
regulate private property have been acknowledged from this nation's inception, and
state-rather than federal-regulation of private property rights is still the rule.300
Thus reliance on state law in the ways suggested in the following paragraphs has
the dual benefits of avoiding risks of unconstitutionality and of according full
respect to traditional private property rights.
State police power regulations are permissible only if they reasonably further
the health, safety, morals, or welfare of the community.3"1 And even these settled
principles are subject to lively debate and litigation today, as private property
owners challenge the extent to which state and local land use regulations may
interfere with theirprivate property rights without effecting compensable takings.
302
Furthermore, these takings issues emanate from the fundamental Fifth Amendment
rule, applicable to federal and state governments at all levels, that private property
shall not "be taken for public use, without just compensation., 303 So the
unquestioned rights of state and local governmental entities to regulate private
property through the exercise of state police power are subject to the dual
restrictions that the regulations further a public purpose and that the regulating
agencies provide just compensation if they regulate too much. Modem takings
jurisprudence has worked over both issues, insisting that land-use regulations have
a demonstrable relationship, or nexus, to a legitimate state interest or purpose
(which must relate to public health, safety, morals, or welfare), and that regulations
impacting too heavily on individual property owners must trigger just
compensation. 3
300. See Thomas, supra note 247, at 377-87; cf. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of
Property Absolutism andModern Government: The Interaction ofPolice Power andProperty Rights,
75 WASH. L. REv. 857 (2000) (tracing the connection with and establishment of police power in
western political philosophy, the U.S. Constitution, and the Washington Constitution as well as federal
and Washington law regarding its role as regulator of private property rights).
301. See generally Thomas, supra note 247 at 377-87 (describing the origins of police power).
See also Talmadge, supra note 300 (tracing the connection with and establishment of police power
in western political philosophy, the U.S. Constitution, and the Washington Constitution as well as
federal and Washington law regarding its role as regulator of private property rights).
302. Almost all takings cases originate as local land-use regulation disputes, but usually are
resolved according to a growing corpus of federal constitutional principles. An excellent summary and
analysis of current takings jurisprudence is found in Payne, supra note 250, at 381-91. See also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 150 L. Ed. 2d 592, 603, 606 (2001) (discussing landowners' inverse
condemnation action wherein he alleged that the state's denial of his application to fill eighteen acres
of coastal wetlands and to construct a beach club constituted a taking for which he was entitled to
compensation).
303. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
304. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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B. Concentration on the Most Serious Problem: Racial Discrimination
Observers seem to agree that the most serious problem addressed by, and the
most significant failure of, the FHA is in the area of race discrimination, mostly
against African Americans.0 5 Most of the other forms of prohibited discrimination
in the original FFIA are so minimal as social problems as to seem silly and vacuous,
especially in comparison to the infringement of private property rights required to
eradicate them. Their inclusion in the FHA can be explained only as an attempt by
proponents forcibly to create a truly open society, swept clean of all private
prejudices.
If those other forms of prohibited discrimination in the original FHA are indeed
lacking in social significance, then one could justly question whether their
restriction constitutes a public purpose for state police power purposes. If these
other prohibitions were eliminated from open-housing regimes, then an owner
would be free to not rent or sell to unmarried cohabitants (for either personal or
religious reasons), to designate housing as only for families with children or not, or
only for males or females, or to prefer selling or renting to a member of one's own
religious congregation (instead of being required to prefer someone from a different
faith). All are perfectly sensible, normal, and innocuous exercises of property rights
currently prohibited and penalized by the plain language of the FHA.
In proposing an alternative legal regime to achieve open housing, not only
should emphasis be shifted from federal law to state law, as described in the
preceding section, but the scope of state law should be limited to prohibit simply
race discrimination, unless-as described below 30-- a private owner chooses to
accept more extensive restrictions for particular land.
If, under federal equal protection law, the most serious problems of race
discrimination in housing can be eliminated from the conduct of public and
governmental entities, and, under state law, from private conduct, then the most
important step toward true open housing will have been achieved.
C. Housing Discrimination Can Be Attacked Using Existing State Property
Law Rules
1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Traditional State Servitude Laws
If a landowner wishes to place restrictions on the use or disposition of the
property, the typical legal device for doing so is a type of servitude known as a
covenant, often denominated as a real covenant or restrictive covenant. 37 Through
305. See, e.g., Calmore, supra note 217, at 1067 (discussing the weaknesses of the Fair Housing
Act and the prevailing existence of segregation in housing); Armstrong, supra note 217, at 1053
(same); Sander, supra note 217, at 1004-10 (same).
306. See infra Part V.C.
307. See John H. Pearson, Real Covenants: Promises Concerning the Use of Land, in 7
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS ED. 133 (David A. Thomas ed., Supp. 2000).
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use of the real covenant, landowners can govern not only their own relationships
as neighboring landowners, but also govern their successors in interest.33 Before
1948, servitudes in the form of racially restrictive covenants (prohibiting occupancy
by non-Caucasians) were often used to restrict the use or disposition of residential
real property. In the important 1948 case of Shelley v. Kraemer,3 °9 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that judicial enforcement of such racially restrictive covenants
constituted a type of "state action" that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment .3 " Nevertheless, it is clear that for other types of
restrictions, real covenants can be used to regulate the occupancy and disposition
of real property.
Real covenants have been a wonderfully flexible and useful tool enabling
neighboring landowners to govern their relationships with each other and their
respective successors in interest according to their individual circumstances.
31 1
These covenants, which are closely related to servitudes known as easements, arose
in the U.S. early in the nineteenth century in response to judicial policies restricting
creation of new types of negative easements, that is, rights in one landowner to
prohibit certain uses of another landowner's land.31 2 The real covenant arose as a
form of an agreement or contract under which landowners promised to observe
certain restrictions on the use of their land-thus overcoming the rules against
creating new negative easements-but the legal rules that enabled these promises
to be enforced against successors in interest were, and continue to be, complex and
burdensome.3 3 Manyjurisdictions, and the first Restatement of Property, recognize
one particular restriction on real covenants that restricts their utility in a way
directly relevant to a proposal that will be explained in this Article: The party
entitled to enforce the covenant must hold land that is benefitted by the covenant.3 4
In other words, if a landowner made a promise to another person to observe a
certain restriction in the use and disposition of the land, and if the promise did not
benefit land held by the promisee, only the promisee could enforce the promise;
successors in interest to the promisee could not enforce a promise that did not
benefit their land.31 5
Thus, for example, if a public-spirited, idealistic and fair-minded landowner
desired that the sale or rental of the land should never be affected by race
discrimination, the landowner could implement that desire by entering into a real
covenant with a local government entity or public interest group, and that entity or
group would have certain rights of enforcement if the covenant were violated.
308. Id. at 133-34.
309. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
310. Id. at23.
311. Pearson, supra note 307, at 133-35.
312. Id. at 136-38.
313. Id. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 857-61 (4th ed. 1998)
(describing the history of covenants).
314. Pearson, supra note 307, at 159; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 543(2)(a) (1944).
315. See Russell R. Reno, The Enforcement of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part 11, 28 VA. L.
REv. 1067, 1087-90 (1942).
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However, if that entity or group owned no land that could be benefitted by
observance and enforcement of the non-discrimination promise, covenant rules in
that jurisdiction might limit the duration and transferability of the covenant's
enforcement rights. Ajurisdiction's rules concerning unreasonable restraints against
alienation or the rule against perpetuities might also inject elements of uncertainty
into land titles encumbered by such servitudes.316
Another obstacle appears in the requirement that the covenant originally have
been created in connection with a related transaction in the land, usually referred
to as "horizontal privity." '317
If a landowner sought to avoid the intricacies and limitations of real covenants
in implementing the desire to make the sale or rental of the land permanently non-
discriminatory, the easement device might look more appealing. Yet, as stated
above, courts might not be receptive to new types of negative easements, because
they are, among other things, encumbrances on title. Moreover, according to
traditional easement rules, negative easements must benefit other land, otherwise
they are not transferable or inheritable.31
2. Remedial State Legislation for Servitudes
Where negative easements in gross have been recognized, such as conservation
easements, they have been authorized by special legislation.319 Indeed, typical
conservation easement legislationprovides a model for the principal proposal in this
Article. By such legislation, all of the traditional limitations associated with
covenants and easements, and indeed the differences between those servitudes, can
be removed in provisions authorizing creations of specialized servitudes for
specialized purposes. Other examples in state legislation include historic
preservation easements32 and solar access easements.32" '
The examples of these special legislative servitudes establish: (1) that a new
easement could be created for just about any legitimate public purposes, (2) that
traditional common law limitations can be removed, and (3) that special incentives
316. These potential problems arise especially in situations where a landowner imposes such
servitude restrictions, with forfeiture provisions, in transferring land to another. See generally David
A. Thomas, Use of Easements in Preserving Utah Historical Sites, 2 UTAH BAR J. 31, 32-33 (1974)
(noting the possibility that an agreement to repurchase property previously transferred at a
predetermined price upon occurrence of a condition subsequent may be an unreasonable restraint on
alienability).
317. See Pearson, supra note 307, at 159; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 543(2)(a) (1944).
318. See John H. Pearson, The Law of Easements: Rights in the Property of Another, in 7
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY: THOMAS ED. 395-98 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). The only types of
negative easements recognized in the United States are appurtenant, and not in gross. See id. at 395-
96, 399-401.
319. See Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements & the Common Law, 8
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2,17 (1989).
320. For an early example, see Thomas, supra note 316, at 31.
321. See David A. Thomas, Property Rights in Airspace, in 7 THOMPSoNON REAL PROPERTY:
THOMAS ED. 2-6 (David A. Thomas ed., 1994).
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for private landowners to enter into such arrangements can be added. Once such an
easement is created and recognized as an interest in land, the possibility arises that
a local governmental entity may condemn or take such an interest by exercise of its
eminent domain power and upon the payment of just compensation.
3. A Modest Proposal: How Housing Discrimination Can Be
Attacked Using State Property Law Rules on Servitudes
If the original federal fair housing provisions that apply to private conduct
3
22
are removed from federal open-housing law-because of their uncertain
constitutionality and so they will not be perceived as pre-empting state open-
housing law-then state legislatures and courts can craft their own open-housing
laws in accordance with traditional property law rules and by extending full respect
to private property rights. To accomplish this, I propose that state legislatures enact
open-housing easement legislation with the following features:
A. A private landowner may grant to a qualified governmental entity or public
interest group an open-housing easement by which the landowner and all
successors in interest are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race in
the sale or rental of the land. The model legislation set forth below expands this
concept to an open property easement, prohibiting discrimination in the sale or
rental of all real property, whether or not currently in use as residential
property.
B. The open property easement is recognized as an interest in land and as an
encumbrance, but does not render a title unmarketable.
C. The open property easement is not subject to traditional rules about proper
subject matter for negative or affirmative easements, for easements appurtenant
or in gross, governing duration or perpetuities, or restricting unreasonable
restraints on alienation.
D. The grantors of open property easements may receive consideration by means
of money, other land or any other things of value, may obtain a reduced tax
valuation of their remaining land, may obtain a tax incentive such as a
deduction or credit for a charitable contribution, or may obtain any combination
of such forms of consideration.3"
E. The holders of open property easements, or their successor in interest, may
enforce open-housing easements by means of equitable or legal remedies. Any
person aggrieved by failure to enforce an open property easement has a private
322. This Article has consistently analyzed only the restrictions contained in the original FHA;
the prohibited discriminations added by later amendments may stand on a different footing, are
supported by no indication of constitutional basis, and are beyond the scope of this Article.
323. Conceivably, some part of condemnation awards could be made available from current
levels of public revenue by lower litigation and enforcement costs that could follow from
implementation of this open-housing easement approach.
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right of action to enforce the open property easement by means of equitable or
legal remedies.
F. Eliminating racial discrimination from the sale or rental of property is declared
to be a public purpose, and certain designated governmental entitles are
authorized to condemn open property easements by exercise of eminent domain
power. A condemnation award formula is established, according to which the
condemnee is awarded a percentage of the full-assessed value of the
encumbered property for tax purposes, plus any increase in that valuation that
becomes effective in the five years following the condemnation. The assessed
value of the encumbered property for tax purposes is reduced by the amount of
any condemnation award.
The proposed legislative language to express these provisions is as follows:
PROPOSED MODEL OPEN PROPERTY EASEMENT ACT
Section 1. This Act shall be known as the [State] Open Property Easement Act.
Section 2. The legislature finds and declares that eliminating racial
discrimination from the sale or rental of real property in the State is a
public purpose, is in the public interest of the people of the State, and
should be promoted by the laws of this State.
Section 3. The legislature creates and recognizes as a real property interest an
open property easement by which one who holds an interest in real
property is prohibited from engaging in racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of that interest.
a. Creation. Any holder of an interest in real property in the state
may create and convey, and any person or entity entitled to hold
interests in real property may accept, an open property easement.
An open property easement may be created by express grant, by
reservation, by restriction, or by circumstances giving rise to an
easementby implication, a prescriptive easement, or an easement
by necessity. An open property easement may be condemned by
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain.
b. Governing Laws. An open property easement is subject to the
laws of this State governing easements generally, subject to the
following exceptions:
(1) the form of the easement may be affimnative or negative,
appurtenant or in gross;
(2) the easement may be perpetual in duration and is fully
transferable and inheritable;
(3) the easement is not subject to the rules of property known as
the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the
rule against perpetuities;
(4) the title to land encumbered by an open property easement is
not thereby rendered unmarketable;
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(5) an open property easement may be recorded as an instrument
affecting title to land if it meets requirements for recording,
except that no recording fee may be charged.
Section 4. Consideration. No consideration is required for the creation, grant or
transfer of an open property easement to be valid. Consideration, if
applicable, may be in the form of money, other land, or other things
of value, or any combination of them. Consideration for an open
property easement conveyed to a governmental entity with authority
to impose taxes on the land may be in the form of money, other land,
other things of value, deductions or exemptions from or credits against
taxes, reduction in assessed tax valuation of the encumbered property,
or any combination of them. Counties and cities are authorized to
enact ordinances providing for uniform and fair compensation to be
paid to grantors or condemnees of open property easements.
Section 5. Condemnation by Eminent Domain Power. Eliminating racial
discrimination from the sale or rental of property is declared to be a
public purpose. Any governmental entity with eminent domain power
over the land encumbered, or to be encumbered by an open property
easement, may condemn an open property easement to achieve that
purpose. The legislature hereby declares that a just compensation
award for an open property easement is equal to [%] of the full fair
market value of the property as assessed for taxation purposes, plus
any additions to the value assessed over the five tax years following
the condemnation. The taxing authority shall also reduce the assessed
value of the land for taxation purposes by the amount of the
condemnation award.
Section 6. Enforcement; Remedies. Holders of open property easements, or
their successors in interest, may enforce open property easements by
means of equitable or legal remedies. In addition, any person
aggrieved by a violation of and failure to enforce an open property
easement has a private right of action to recover appropriate damages
caused to the plaintiff by the violation and also may obtain
enforcement of the open property easement by equitable or legal
remedies.
Section 7. An open property easement may be in essentially the following form:
[Name of grantor], of [address of grantor], hereby
conveys to [name and address of grantee] a servitude
known as an open property easement in the property
described below. The grantor covenants, for the grantor
and grantor's successors and assigns, that the occupant of
the property will not practice any form of racial
discrimination in the use or disposition of the property.
This servitude runs with the land, is binding on the
property, and is binding on the grantor's successors and
assigns:
[Description of Property]
[Signature of Grantor]
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VI. CONCLUSION
A. Summary
This Article has proposed and documented the following points concerning the
FHA provisions restricting private conduct:
A. The FHA declares that it is subject to constitutional limitations.
B. No language in the FHA indicates the basis of its constitutional authority.
C. The legislative history of the FHA shows that constitutionality was discussed
in Senate debates, but was not mentioned in committee reports.
D. During the debates, FHA proponents argued that the FHA was constitutional
because of federal legislative power implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and
in the Commerce Clause.
E. Court decisions on FHA constitutionality have not relied on the Commerce
Clause or on the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather on the Thirteenth
Amendment, mostly because of the Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 32" decision
in 1968. No U.S. Supreme Court decision has ruled directly on the
constitutionality of the FHA. All of the rationales employed in the other federal
courts are seriously flawed; no persuasive basis for FHA constitutionality can
be shown. No rationale for constitutionality has ever been suggested that
justifies any type of prohibited private discrimination except against African
Americans.
F. In its application, the FHA's constitutionality has been adjudicated only with
respect to possible conflicts with freedom of speech. The FHA in those cases
has been upheld only because the plaintiffs' speech was deemed to be
unprotected commercial speech, a rationale which today is probably no longer
valid. In other areas, such as private, noncommercial expression, religious
exercise and takings, the FHA appears plainly in violation of the Constitution.
G. If the FHA is vulnerable to full or partial invalidation, alternative approaches
to open housing should be sought. Suggested solutions include amending the
FHA and relying more heavily on state law and traditional property law
concepts with no risk of unconstitutionality.
H. FHA vulnerabilities easily can be eliminated by confining its prohibitions to
state action, which can be based on the Equal Protection provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
I. States, which are the sources of most common and traditional law governing
private property rights, already heavily support open-housing measures of
various kinds and can be expected to act responsibly.
J. Some features of servitudes-specifically, of real covenants and
easements-may be employed to protect property from unwanted private
discrimination without any risk of unconstitutionality and with full respect to
324. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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traditional private property rights. To the extent these servitude forms are not
completely suitable, corrective legislation to authorize an open-housing
easement is proposed, similar to legislation authorizing conservation or historic
preservation easements. The rights of property disposition surrendered in such
servitudes, either by donation or eminent domain condemnation, should be
treated as rights of value for which compensation is appropriate.
B. Evaluative Conclusion
It would be easy to misjudge this Article as a plea to turn back the clock and
throw away all of the civil rights gains in housing won since 1968. Such a
perception could not be further from the truth. Open-housing advocates question
how much progress has occurred since 1968. The case reports show many
individual plaintiffs obtaining relief under the FHA, but discrimination and
disregard of the FHA still seem to be widespread. Lack of respect for FHA
requirements may exist in part because of their excesses.
Some of the FHA private conduct prohibitions have never been significant
social problems and seem almost silly when compared with the more serious
concerns over racial discrimination, yet they are all lumped together in the FHA.
The FHA is an idealistic attempt to cleanse society of all private prejudice in
housing matters, an attempt to remake our society in the utopian image espoused
by FHA proponents. Much of this, while not unworthy, goes well beyond what the
Constitution requires of citizens or permits its government to do. The attempt to
employ the full force of a government to require uniform observance of standards
of conduct seems appropriate in our criminal law, and may otherwise be seen in the
approach taken by some militant Muslim societies. Quite possibly, the FHA's
excesses are responsible for its ineffectiveness.
It is common for civil rights legislation to be opposed on the ground that it
violates constitutional restrictions on government regulation. For some, the
consequences of such violations seem minor compared to the sense of urgency in
correcting civil rights abuses. Yet, a danger lurks, for once the constitutional
restraints on government power are removed for what may seem a worthy goal,
they may not be raised again later for someone else's more questionable notion of
a worthy goal. It is always better to seek the worthy goal within the legitimate
governmental bounds set by the Constitution.
In 1942, a small farmer in Ohio was penalized under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (AAA) for having sowed twenty-three acres of winter wheat, rather
than his allotted 11.1 acres; the grain was ostensibly to be used for feeding his farm
animals, for seeding, for his home consumption, and for sale on the local market.
325
The farmer challenged the constitutionality of using the AAA to regulate his wholly
intrastate farm activity.326 In response, the U.S. Supreme Court in Wickard v.
325. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1942).
326. Id.
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Filburn 327declared that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate even
individual intrastate activities which, when aggregated with other individuals'
similar activities, might eventually affect Congress's attempts to regulate interstate
commerce.328 This revolutionary new view of the Commerce Clause effectively
dropped all barriers to congressional power over daily lives, because almost any
individual activity with any economic aspect can be represented as eventually
affecting interstate commerce. As extreme and essentially untenable as Wickard is,
it has still been regularly cited in defense of the constitutionality of various
questionable extensions of federal power over citizens' lives, including on behalf
of the FHA. Similarly, if the FHA remains unchallenged, no aspect of daily living
can be free from federal regulation if a sufficiently idealist motivation can be cited.
To oppose this danger is not to oppose civil rights or racial reconciliation; it is to
decry resort to the easy way or the short cut, rather than seeking to achieve a better
society within the proper bounds of our profoundly good frame of government.
327. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
328. Id. at 124-25.
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